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Article 5

LAW INVENTORY 1971
Ronald A. Anderson*
I. Introduction
The middle third of the twentieth century has witnessed many changes in
the law. Over and beyond the problem of giving an answer to a particular
question, change of law generally presents a social problem. Some applaud the
changes or a particular change as being a step toward attaining justice. Others
deplore the particular change or the fact that the law can be changed so readily,
contending that the instability and uncertainty are undesirable and reduce the
law to the status of a railroad time schedule, "subject to change without notice."
As we are almost at the mathematical two-thirds point of the twentieth century,
it is believed that some inventory should be taken. Our interest is twofold: as
lawyers we are interested in the rules of law; as citizens we are concerned with
the running of a free society. This article has been written with such objectives
in mind and thus may serve as an epilogue to the first two-thirds of this century
and a prologue to the final third.
Some of the topics discussed may seem unrelated to others but we must
rise above the compartmentalization inspired by convenience of classification and
seek to find the pattern of "today's law." Just as the sharp edges of the pieces of
a mosaic disappear when we stand back, leaving only the pattern visible, we can
see a pattern and a direction in the changes that have been made in the middle
third of this century. One perceives an increasing protection afforded the
person, accompanied by a furtherance of good faith and protection from oppression, hardship, and exploitation. In terms of structure of society one sees a
constantly increasing segment of life leave the area of free enterprise and become
subject to government regulation, with the government being the federal government, and the control being exercised by an administrative agency rather than a
traditional branch of government-executive, judicial, or legislative.
II. The Fall and Rise of Legal Concepts
During the third of the twentieth century under consideration, many "traditional" legal concepts were abandoned by the courts. Many courts currently
feel that the old legal concepts do not adequately safeguard or promote the
objectives of society.' Many courts have been influenced by the general thought
of Holmes: "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule
simply persists from blind imitation of the past."2
Courts have repeatedly been stating that it is the duty of judges to re* Professor of Law and Government, Drexel University.
1 See R. ANDERSON, SOCIAL FORCES AND THE LAw (1969).
2 0. HOLMES, COLLECTED PAPERS 187 (1920).
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evaluate rather than to follow old concepts. For example, in a case involving
the fitness of a house, the court rejected the concept of caveat emptor when the
buyer purchased from the builder-vendor while the house was in the course of
construction, and implied a warranty against structural defects; the court stating
in so doing: "The doctrine of caveat emptor is one of judicial origin and, since
our statutes are silent on the subject, no restriction rests on our courts for delimiting the application of the rule ...the law should be based upon current concepts of what is right and just and the judiciary should be alert to the neverending need for keeping its common-law principles abreast with the times.
Ancient distinctions which make no sense in today's society and tend to discredit
the law should be readily rejected. . . ."' The following are some of the
significant changes that have occurred.4
A. Product Liability
The nearly total disappearance of the limitation of lack of privity and the
rise of the concept of strict tort liability have revolutionized the law of product
liability.5 It is likely that further change will take place because there will be
a backwash of the strict tort liability concept upon the warranty concept and
there will be a general overflow of product liability concepts into non-sales
areas.
With respect to the interaction of the several theories of product liability,
strict tort liability may be explained as an effort to permit recovery where none
was permitted by the warranty law. Specifically, it was designed to avoid limitations found in warranty which were stated in terms of lack of privity, lack of
notice, and disclaimer.' The existence of the strict tort rule permitting recovery
has had a great influence in persuading courts to liberalize the warranty rules
with the net result that warranty recovery tends to become identical with strict
tort.' In one instance, the court expressly declared that it was expanding the
3 Rothberg v. Olenik, 262 A.2d 461, 462, 467 (Vt. 1970). This pattern of re-evaluation
is seen in many areas: "Troubled by a growing disparity between the Chessman reading of
section 209 and a 'current of common sense in the construction and application of statutes
defining the crime of kidnapping'.. . ." California v. Mutch, 4 Cal. 3d 389, 93 Cal. Rptr. 721,
482 P.2d 633 (1971) (emphasis added).
Note also the explanation of the genesis of the concept of promissory estoppel: "The
development of the law of promissory estoppel is an attempt by the courts to keep remedies
abreast of increased moral consciousness of honesty and fair representations in all business
dealings ...." Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
4 Of necessity, I have ignored many changes, such as the growing abolition of immunity
from tort suits in the case of charitable institutions, spouses, parents, and political subdivisions.
I shall be happy to reply to letters sent to me at Drexel University, 32nd and Market Streets,
Room 505B Matheson Hall, Philadelphia, Pa. 19104, if anyone desires further information
on any matter related to this article.
5 Notice that the plural form of "products liability" is commonly used. This would
appear to be a misuse of the plural and was probably initially a carry-over of the terminal "s"
in premises liability. Note that one does not say "malpractices" liability. In view of the fact
that a product liability suit involves only one product-the one which was defective and
caused harm, it appears that the singular form is to be preferred. If it were a question' of
liability of a manufacturer for noncompliance with a government standard relating to his
"products" generally there would be greater reason to use a plural form.
6 1 ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314:156, at 636 (2d ed. 1970).
7 There of course remains the significant distinction that a warranty of fitness applies to
any defect which is inconsistent with fitness, whereas strict tort liability is not applied unless
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warranty concept as it was absurd that warranty recovery should be less broad
than that permitted under strict tort liability2
Concepts of product liability have been extended to transactions which
were not the sale of goods. Thus, product liability concepts have been applied to
permit recovery where the transaction was not a sale of goods but a true lease of
goods,' a free sample distribution of goods,"° and to goods consumed in the
course of the rendition of services.11 Contrary to the traditional analysis made in
the blood transfusion cases, several courts have imposed product liability where
a blood transfusion caused serum hepatitis.'
When a service is rendered merely as an incident to a pattern of selling,
strict tort liability can be applied. Thus it has been held that a distributor of
new automobile tires and a tire manufacturer could be liable in strict tort
although the sale was made by the manufacturer to the automobile owner and
the distributor merely provided the service of installing the tires."
the defect is such as to make the use of the product dangerous to a greater degree than a
user would reasonably contemplate.
Other significant differences are the effect of a disclaimer of liability and the operation
of statutes of limitations.
8 Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217. 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
9 Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 '(1969)
(warranty); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 466 P.2d 722 (1970)
(strict tort liability); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 470 P.2d 240 (Hawaii 1970)
(strict tort liability).
See also Baker v. Seattle, 484 P.2d 405 (Wash. 1971), holding that a disclaimer of
liability clause in a true lease of a chattel was subject to the same limitations as would be applicable in the case of a sale of goods on the theory that "The legislature of this state has
enunciated a public policy with regard to disclaimers of liability in commercial transactions
by enacting the Uniform Commercial Code."
Sales concepts of the Uniform Commercial Code have been extended to "lease" transactions since "it would be anomalous if this large body of commercial transactions were subject
to different rules of law than other commercial transactions which tend to the identical result."
Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearinghouse, 59 Misc. 2d 226,
229, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392, 395 '(1969), rev'd on other grounds, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585 (App. Div.
N.Y. 1970).
10 McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967) (strict tort liability).
11 A preparation used and consumed in the course of a beauty shop treatment carries the
same warranty liability as a product sold in a store. Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 102
N.J. Super. 279, 246 A.2d 11 (1968), aff'd, 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969); Carpenter v.
Best's Apparel, Inc., 4 Wash. App. 439, 481 P.2d 924 (1970). Contra, Epstein v. Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (1963).
12 Cunningham v. MacNeal Hospital, 113 Ill. App. 2d 74, 251 N.E.2d 733 (1969)
(strict tort liability); Hoffman v. Misericordia Hospital, 439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970)
(warranty liability). See also Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital, 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d
879 (1967) (warranty liability), reo'd on other grounds, 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969).
In Mauran v. Mary Fletcher Hospital, 318 F. Supp. 297 (D. Vt. 1970), the court indicated
that an implied warranty of fitness might arise under Vermont law when an anesthetic was
administered in a hospital. The court referred to the trend in favor of implying warranties in
the sale of new houses and then observed, "If a new house, why not anesthesia?"
13 Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968) (this
decision is particularly significant as the appellate court expressly reversed the trial court for
holding that the distributor could not be liable in strict tort in the absence of a sale).
A contractor remodeling a home may be held liable on breach of warranty and strict
tort liability for fire damage to the house caused by a fire resulting from a leaky fitting connecting a hot water heater installed but not supplied by him. Worrell v. Barnes, 484 P.2d
373 (Nev. 1971) (sustaining liability as against contention that transaction was not a sale of
goods and sustaining strict tort liability as against the contention that the manufacturer had
not manufactured a product) (appellate court reversed lower court for limiting plaintiff to
negligence theory of product liability).
In Carpel v. Saget Studios, 9 UCC REP. SRV. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1971), a contract to take
photographs was held to be a contract for the sale of goods.
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It is likely that in time the social force in favor of protecting the person
which underlies the present wave of consumer protectionism will develop rules of
law which will entitle a good faith "customer" to a protection comparable to
that which the "buyer" of "goods" now enjoys."4 The emphasis given in product
liability cases to the necessity of rehabilitating the plaintiff, as opposed to finding
fault on the part of the defendant, will undoubtedly lead the courts to question
why all persons should not have the same rehabilitative protection as the buyer
of goods. When this question is asked, it is likely that the answer will be in favor
of the plaintiff without regard to whether the transaction which led to his harm
which necessitates such rehabilitation was a sale of goods or any other kind of
transaction.
With the extension of the warranty and strict tort concepts into the area
of real estate law, the array of plaintiffs protected by a product liability theory
increases, and, by the same token, it will become increasingly difficult for a
court to refuse to find liability in favor of a plaintiff because he did not buy goods.
One can anticipate that ultimately the courts will abandon the concept of
a "defect" in the goods and will impose liability when the use of the goods, at
least in a manner which was reasonably contemplated by the defendant, exposed
the plaintiff or members of the class to which the plaintiff belonged to an unreasonable degree of risk. This would permit liability to be imposed, as has been
done 5 where the design of the automobile was such that upon collision at low
impact the gas tank sheared off and threw flaming gasoline into the automobile.'
B. Property Ownership
The limitations upon ownership of real estate have expanded. Contrary to
the common-law rule that no implied warranty of fitness arises in the sale of real
estate, one-fifth of the states now imply such a warranty. 7
A number of states imply a similar warranty in the case of the leasing of
14 Note the language employed to sustain the implication of a warranty of fitness of leased
real estate in Javins v. First Nat. Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970). "Modem
contract law has recognized that the buyer of goods and services in an industrialized society
must rely upon the skill and honesty of the supplier to assure that the goods and services are
of adequate quality. In interpreting most contracts, courts have sought to protect the
legitimate expectations of the buyer and have steadily widened the seller's responsibility for
the quality of goods and services through implied warranties of fitness and merchantability ....
Note the conjunctive use of "goods and services." In the field of strict tort liability, see Elmore
v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 451 P.2d 84 '(1969).
15 Badorek v. General Motors Corp., 12 Cal. App. 3d 447, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970).
16 "A product, although faultlessly made, may nevertheless be deemed 'defective' . . . and
subject the supplier thereof to strict liability ...
" Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d
465, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629, 467 P.2d 229 (1970).
It is to be noted that the so-called defect in the Badorek case was not the cause of the harm
but was merely a matter affecting the extent to which harm would be sustained. This is
significant because of the variation that it makes in the concept of proximate cause: instead
of the defect's being the proximate cause of the harm, it is possible as in the case cited, for
the negligence of the other driver to be the "cause" with the character of the defendant's
product merely being a matter affecting the extent of the injuries sustained because of the
fault of the other driver.
17 Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C.
407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1971); Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1971);
Weeks v. Slavick Builders, 24 Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503 (1971); Rothberg v. Olenik,
262 A.2d 461 '(Vt. 1970). See also Cochran v. Keeton, 252 So. 2d 307 (Ala. App. 1971).
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real estate.' 8 Strict tort liability has been applied to the vendor of real estate. 9
When the owner of real estate sells or rents, he is prohibited in a number
of ways from discriminating against others, and a state constitution may not
authorize him to discriminate.2 0
In using his land, the owner must not offend pollution controls, which have
been added to the restrictions already imposed by zoning laws and restrictive
covenants, and the general limiting concepts of the law of nuisance and of
property.
Under a new doctrine which might be called "pseudo-dedication," an
owner who opens his real estate or place of business to the public cannot prevent
his employees or members of the public from exercising first amendment rights
on his property. 2 ' This right has been extended so as to give the right to nonemployees and non-customers to enter the area of the owner's place of business
otherwise open to the public such as parking lots, pavements, and waiting rooms
and solicit funds and signatures supporting the adoption of anti-pollution laws
or protesting the involvement of the United States in foreign wars. 2
May a landowner leave his land undeveloped and make no use of it? Contrary to common law, there is authority that society can tell the owner that he
must put his land to use. In the early days of redevelopment, the land taken
was a slum area which was obviously deteriorated. From this beginning, redevelopment expanded to permit the taking of areas that were likely to become
slums. Recent authority holds that redevelopment is not necessarily linked to
elimination or prevention of slums but permits the taking by eminent domain of
vacant, unimproved land which was standing idle because the title to the land
was held by numerous owners, the theory being that communities should eliminate "stagnant and unproductive" conditions of land and for that purpose may
use the power of eminent domain in order to "serve the health, welfare, social
and economic interests, and sound growth of the community."2
Decisions such as that just noted are significant not only in themselves but
in terms of the potential threat that they hold for the traditional concepts of
free enterprise and private ownership. By traditional views, the owner of land in
the Levin case could have let it stand undeveloped as long as he chose. By the
18 Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 482 (Hawaii 1969); Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,
428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine, 323 N.Y.S.2d 363
(1970) (implied warranty of fitness as a habitation in conformity with the standards of the
housing code, and rent of tenant reduced 20% because of breach); Kline v. Burns, 276
A.2d 248 (N.H. 1970).
19 Schipiper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
20 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 '(1967).
21 Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
22 Sutherland v. Southcenter Shopping Center, 3 Wash. App. 2d 833, 478 P.2d 792
(1970); Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501, 477 P.2d 733 (1970), cert.
den. sub noma., Homart Development Co. v. Diamond, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); Tanner v.
Lloyd Corp., 446 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1971). A traditional approach would have reached the
contrary conclusion on the ground that the property was private property and that the owner
by permitting the public to enter thereon did not extend an unqualified license but only made
a limited invitation for a particular purpose.
23 Levin v. Bridgewater Township Committee, 57 N.J. 506, 274 A. 2d 1 (1971). Note also
that community redevelopment is in a sense the reverse side of the coin of which the other
side is zoning. In zoning, the community speaks in negative terms of what shall not be done
with land; in redevelopment, the community speaks in affirmative terms of what shall be
done with land. Both concepts would make Adam Smith most uncomfortable.
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Levin case, society determines when the land is to be used. If society may do
this, will it not be able to tell the landowner whether he should or should not
farm his land, and what crops he should or should not plant; whether he should
mine minerals from his land? And from thence, is it not an easy progression to
telling him what use he should make of the farm products or the minerals? To
whom he should sell? And in short make all the management decisions for him
that under the free enterprise concept are made by management? How does the
law erect a boundary line between cases where the will of society dictates the use
of property and the area in which the landowner retains his common-law managerial prerogative?24
The problem here considered has another dimension. If society can tell the
landowner how he should utilize his land for the good of the community, can it
not tell the individual how he should use his talents and ability to work? It will
2
be very difficult to maintain a dividing line between property and person. 1
The questions here raised cannot be ignored with the patriot's fervent
belief that it cannot happen here. As far back as 1803, Madison deplored the
fact that in the natural course of events the power of government grows and
the liberty of the individual declines. As we examine the living constitution of
today we must recognize that Madison had a deep understanding tantamount
to clairvoyance.
C. Premises Liability
The liability of the occupier of premises has been traditionally stated in
terms of the status of the plaintiff as a trespasser, a licensee, or an invitee. There
is authority which will probably initiate a trend which by the end of this century
will wipe out that distinction and treat premises liability merely as a question
of ordinary negligence law; and whether the plaintiff is a trespasser, a licensee,
or an invitee will be merely one of the circumstances which the reasonable man
should consider.26 If that result is reached, the legal historian will undoubtedly
24 Note that in a broad sense, the problem here is not new because the twentieth century
had already turned its back on the common law which would permit a landowner to leave
his land in its natural state. For decades, the landowner has been told that he must drain
swamps and cut weeds to prevent the growth of mosquitoes and farm parasites and to prevent
the spread of fire. What is now taking place is the transition from (a) regulating to prevent
physical harm to the surrounding area to (b) regulating to prevent socio-economic harm.
At various times, the law has sought to make a distinction between physical harm and
economic harm. Thus it countenanced the regulation of conditions of employment to prevent
industrial accidents long before it approved the regulation of the economic conditions of employment to assure the worker a minimum wage.
While we can note that protection from personal injury is often the opening wedge in
the development of a new legal theory, it is merely a matter of time before the law moves on
to seek to protect economic interests. Consider how the strict tort liability concept which
initially was concerned with injury to the person has now in most jurisdictions spread to protect
property and economic loss as well.
25 The point that the thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution would
prevent the transition indicated in the text can be met by the same technique that permits
equity to issue a negative injunction against working for other persons with the result that
economic pressure compels the contract-breaking employee to work for the employer with
whom he had contracted to work.
26 This view has already been adopted in Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 28 Colo. App. 400, 474
P.2d 796 (1970).
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look back and contend that this approach began a long time ago and that what
up to now have been called "exceptions" to the common-law rule are merely
early unrecognized applications of the "negligence" concept.
The common-law trespasser's rule is generally subject to exceptions in
favor of (1) trespassing children; (2) minimal trespassers, as persons standing on
your doorstep to find shelter from the rain while waiting for the bus; and
(3) recurrent tolerated trespassers, as people cutting across the railroad track
to get to the station. In these three situations, the common law has reached a
result which would fit in with a negligence analysis of liability: there is a foreseeable or probable pattern of conduct with foreseeable harm if certain precautions be not taken by the occupier, and, therefore, he is liable if he fails to take
those precautions.
Recurring licensees have been held to be entitled to the protection ordinarily
afforded invitees. By this view, where a mailman regularly uses the premises,
the occupier may have a duty, because of his expectable presence, to warn him of
a defective condition of a porch step; even though the mailman is merely a
licensee." Again the exception can be rationalized more readily in terms of a
negligence standard of care.
The definition of invitee has been almost universally broadened to include a
person who is invited on the premises, expressly or by implication, under such
circumstances that he has reason to believe that the premises are safe-as contrasted with presence for the economic benefit of the occupier of the land. Note
the similarity in the shift of viewpoint from (a) what the invitor will obtain to
(b) what the invitee expects, and the shift in the field of product liability from
(a) fault or act of the defendant to (b) protection from dangers which the user
is not likely to anticipate.
As another facet of the problem, the premises liability plaintiff will undoubtedly be able to go beyond negligence and obtain recovery on28strict tort
liability and reach beyond the occupier to a former owner or builder.
D. Good Faith
Good faith is acquiring a particular significance in the law as well as a new
content.29
The Uniform Commercial Code declares that "every contract or duty within
27 Haffey v. Lemieux, 154 Conn. 435, 224 A.2d 551 (1966).
28 This has already been permitted in the Schipper case. See Note 19 supra.
29 Illustrative of this new content, I have for some time inquired of graduate students
in business administration how they would answer the question whether the ultimate buyer
could sue the remote manufacturer when the product purchased from the middleman caused
the purchaser harm. To the lawyer, this of course called for an answer in terms of whether

lack of privity was a defense.
The general reaction in the last ten years has been that the subpurchaser should of course

recover, but the surprising thing is that some explain or rationalize this result on the ground
that "good faith" requires the manufacturer to be liable if his product causes harm.
I know that my random sampling cannot be accepted as conclusively proving anything
but I strongly suspect that the non-law-trained man of the 20th Century is giving to good faith
a much different meaning than did the 19th Century law court. If this be so, it is significant

because sooner or later the beliefs or mores of society at large find their way into the rules of
law. The "good faith" decisions cited hereafter reflect that shifting point of view.
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this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."3
The Official Code Comment supports the view that this is not a requirement
that is peculiar to the Code but that, to the contrary, the Code is merely restating a general requirement applicable to all transactions. The decisions both
under the Code and as to non-Code matters confirm the far reach of the concept
of good faith.31
In the field of contract law, good faith is not only a positive element or
duty but is gradually permitting "indefinite" agreements to be deemed binding.
The output and requirement contract is now binding as against the argument
that it is invalid because illusory and indefinite since there is no fixed obligation
to have an output or to have requirements.32
Good faith of the parties has also been relied upon to overcome the "illusory promise-no consideration" argument in the case of contracts which by their
letter permitted a party to render such services as he deemed necessary. 33
The complexities and unpredictability of modem business life have made
courts willing to trust to the good faith of the parties and to sustain the validity
of their working arrangements although a few decades ago such arrangements
would have been condemned as mere agreements to agree and therefore not
binding contracts. As an illustration, it has been held that a sales representative
could recover reasonable compensation on orders over $250,000.00, although
his contract merely specified that a subsequent agreement would be made as to
compensation for orders of that size."4
Flexible working arrangements that permit one of the parties a large
degree of choice or freedom of decision are common. For example, consider an
arrangement between a bank and an automobile dealer by which the bank
agrees to purchase from the dealer contracts for the sale of cars to its customers,
30 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-203.
31 See First National Bank v. Freedman, 244 So. 2d 183 (Fla. App. 1971), in which
the court when faced with a conflict of authority, adopted one view and rejected contrary
decisions on the ground that their rejection was required by "basic principles of honesty and
fair dealing."
Note also the indication that "unconscionability" decisions may be regarded as merely
specific applications of the obligation to act in good faith. Thus it has been said that "while
the unconscionability referred in § 2-302 may be conduct worse in some degree than the lack
of good faith prohibited by § 1-203, both impose the same basic obligation of fair dealing
in commercial transactions. This obligation is especially imperative where one party is at a
disadvantage. . . ." Urdang v. Muse, 114 N.J. Super. 372, 276 A.2d 397 '(1971).
32 While such contracts are recognized by U.C.C. § 2-306, their judicial acceptance had
in most states been an accomplished fact by the time the Code was drafted. Note the importance attached by the framers to the concept of "good faith." In spite of the declaration of
the existence of a duty to act in good faith by U.C.C. § 1-203, the output and requirements
section declares that it refers to "such actual output or requirements as may occur in good
faith." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-306(1).
33 Mandel v. Liebman, 303 N.Y. 88, 100 N.E.2d 149 (1951); Griswold v. Heat, Inc.,
108 N.H. 119, 229 A.2d 183 (1967).
34 E.B. Kaiser Co.v. Ludlow, 243 So. 2d 62 (Miss. 1971) (the contract specified "special
commissions allowances and/or arrangements would be established by the principal for jobs
greater than $250,000").
See also Admiral Plastics Corp. v. Trueblood, Inc., 436 F.2d 1335 (6th Cir. 1971)
(declaring that where a manufacturer contracted to build three unique machines for the buyer
and neither had any prior experience with the machines, "it was understandable that certain
terms were left unspecified [but] this in no way detracts from the validity of the contract . . .
the UCC recognizes such situations where good faith and cooperation are necessary to the
successful fulfillment of a contract."
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the bank agreeing to purchase "such conditional sales contracts... as are acceptable to the bank at agreed rates of discount."3
When parties to a contract in a good-faith effort to meet the business
realities of the situation agree to a reduction of contract terms, there is authority
that the promise of one party to accept a lesser performance by the other is
binding even though technically the promise to render the lesser performance is
not consideration because the obligor was already obligated to render the
greater performance. Thus it has been held that a landlord's promise to reduce
the rent was binding where the tenant could not pay thd original rent and the
landlord preferred to have the building occupied even though receiving a smaller
rental.3 6 Not only is good faith being relied upon to give validity to an agreement
which would otherwise not be deemed a binding contract but good faith is being
invoked to prevent one party from exercising a right expressly given him by the
contract.3 7
The increased emphasis on good faith is part of the same stream of social
responsibility that is apparently expanding "concealment" liability by holding
that it is "fraud" for a seller to fail to disclose a material fact which the buyer
would not be likely to know or to think of inquiring about,38 even though such
matters were of public record. 9
As part of this trend of protecting one who relies, there is a tendency
developing in the law to regard statements as an abbreviated or summary statement of subsidiary facts rather than as an opinion or sales talk. Thus it has been
held that the statement that a house was of "sound construction" was a sum35 Biggins v. Southwest Bank, 322 F. Supp. 62, 63 (S.D. Calif. 1971). This policy is
also manifest in the recognition of a floating lien on shifting inventory, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 9-204; a perfected security interest in unidentifiable proceeds, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

CODE § 9-306(4)(b); and "open" terms in contracts for the sale of goods, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-201(3), 2-305, and 2-308 to 2-311.

Note also the ability of the payment assignor of an executory contract and the original
debtor to modify the contract without the consent of the secured creditor assignee, even
though there has been notice of the assignment; as long as the modification is made in good
faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial standards. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 9-318(2). The Official Code Comment states that "this rule may do some violence to accepted doctrines of contract law. Nevertheless, it is a sound and indeed a necessary rule in
view of the realities of large scale procurement...."
36 Haun v. Corkland, 55 Tenn. App. 292, 399 S.W.2d 518 (1965). As to inroads made
by the Code into the doctrine of consideration, see Anderson, The Part-Payment Check and
the Uniform Commercial CodeAM. Bus. L. Ass'N J(1971).
37 Clausen & Sons, Inc. v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 395 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1968) (re.
stricting a franchiser's power to exercise an express right of termination). Likewise it has
been held that a supplier (California Canners and Growers) could not terminate its exclusive
distribution contract without notice to the distributor (Melchiorre) even though no duration
was stated in the contract which could be cancelled by either party, the court stating "he
would need time to negotiate another source of supply. It would, indeed, be a weaselly phrase
if despite Cal Can's avouchment of the exclusiveness of Melchiorre's right or privilege, it
could with impunity dissolve and reassign the distributorship the moment after it had been
consummated. Cal Can's abrogation ought not to be dismissed through so sterile a reading
of its assurance." Melchiorre v. California Canners and Growers, 394 F.2d 413 '(4th Cir.
1968).
Note the somewhat comparable utilization of the concept of good faith by U.C.C. §
1-108 in restricting the power of a creditor to accelerate a debt.
38 Masser v. Lind, 181 Neb. 365, 148 N.W.2d 831 (1967); Barylski v. Andrews, 439
S.W.2d 356 (Mo. App. 1969); Michigan National Bank v. Marston, 185 N.W.2d 47 (Mich.
App. 1971).
39 Peterson v. Arrellono, 289 Minn. 541, 185 N.W.2d 282 (1971).
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mation as to existing facts relating to its construction and not sales talk or a
matter of opinion."
Additionally, the concept of good faith is bringing new limitations upon
management and corporation law."
E. Consumer Protection from Unconscionable Terms
One of the most significant developments in the era under consideration
is the rise of the concept of "unconscionability" and its use as a weapon in the
war for consumer protection. If a contract for the sale of goods or any clause
thereof is "unconscionable," a court may refuse to enforce the clause or the
contract or may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid
an unconscionable result.4 2
The courts have seldom explicitly defined the term "unconscionability" or
"unconscionable contract." The definition most commonly used is the vague
one found in an early English case that an unconscionable bargain is one "such
as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand,
40 Short v. Mitchell, 454 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
41 Diamond v. Oreamuno, 29 App. Div. 2d 285, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1968) '(sustaining
right of corporation to recover profit obtained by corporate officers selling their shares to a
non-complaining outsider when officers did not disclose that earnings information not publicly
known was unfavorable). In some instances, it is unlawful for a shareholder to act without
disclosing to the other contracting party information he possesses by virtue of his position
within the corporation. For example, it is unlawful for a majority shareholder to purchase
the stock of a minority shareholder without disclosing material facts affecting the value of
the stock known to the majority shareholder by virtue of his position of power within the
corporation and not known to the selling minority shareholder.
Some degree of restriction is placed on a parent corporation in requiring "fairness"
in its dealings with its subsidiary. Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970).
42 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code extends
this provision to credit and loan transactions with consumers. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT
CODE § 5.108.
As to the interpretation and application of the provision of the U.C.C., see I ANDERSON
ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 390-409 (1970).
When a sales transaction was disguised as a lease from a third person, in consequence
of which the buyer did not have the benefit of a consumer protection statute applicable to
"sales," the clause of the lease obligating the buyer to pay the "rent" without regard to any
breach of warranty was not enforceable because unconscionable, on the theory that the consumer protection statute set a standard to measure unconscionability. United States Leasing
Corp. v. Franklin Plaza Apartments, 319 N.Y.S.2d 531 (N.Y. Cir. 1971). In holding that
the unconscionability section of the Code applied in this situation, the court declared, "It
is no longer a novelty to refer to the 'unconscionable contract or clause' section of the Uniform Commercial Code *(Sec. 2-302), as a proviso that is substantially broader in application
than its appearance in the article on Sales would seem to indicate. It is considered to be
'a barometer not only in the area of sales, but as to other types of contracts, as well as new
conceptual approaches to our entire body of law.' " 319 N.Y.S.2d at 535. In Educational
Beneficial, Inc. v. Reynolds, 324 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971), a contract for computer
training tuition was held not binding because unconscionable, citing U.C.C. § 2-302.
In Dean v. Uniuersal C.I.T., 114 N.J. Super. 132, 275 A.2d 154 (1971), the court
held void as unconscionable a clause in a credit sale contract for an automobile which barred
the buyer from claiming that there were any items therein, as in the glove compartment, unless he gave registered mail notice within five days after repossession of the automobile. It is
significant that the court did not sustain the clause as a reasonable protection from fraudulent
claims designed to give the creditor reasonable opportunity to protect the alleged property
of the debtor and to protect himself from liability. Significant is the fact that the court
used "unconscionability" as the basis for invalidating the clause and made no reference at
this point of the opinion to the fine print of the contract as furnishing a basis for holding that
the "property claim" clause was a "surprise" clause, so that the buyer's signing the contract
could not be regarded as an assent thereto.
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and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other."'" One may well
question the utility of this definition when one recalls that the steamboat was
described by society as Fulton's Folly and the purchase of Alaska by the United
States was long condemned as Seward's Folly. Seeking to give meaning to what
society is striving to say, one can sense that unconscionability is an expansion of
the concepts of illegality and "contrary to public policy." That is, at first a
contract was enforceable unless it was outright illegal. In time, judges were
reluctant to enforce some contracts which seemed very wrong to them and they
did not feel that the chance circumstance that the lawmaker had not yet
declared such contracts illegal should require the courts to enforce them. Thus,
the judges developed the concept of invalidity because contrary to public policy,
even though not legislatively declared "illegal." Today we have a widening of
this concept of the extent to which society will condemn a contract: today the
contract (1) must not be illegal, (2) must not offend public policy, even though
it is not illegal, and (3) must not be unconscionable, even though it is not illegal
and does not offend public policy as formerly defined. If we go behind terminology, we find two basic questions: (1) Who establishes the criterion or
standard by which a contract is condemned? (2) What is the consequence of
condemnation?
If the contract is "illegal," it is the lawmaker who has declared the public
policy that such a contract is not to be allowed. Likewise, the consequence of
such condemnation is that either or both of the contracting parties may be subject to criminal prosecution and punishment, and the contract may not be
binding. In the case of a contract which is contrary to public policy, the
declarant of the standard is the court, and the consequence of violating the
standard is merely that the contract may not be enforceable as between the
parties; neither party, however, is subject to criminal prosecution. In the case
of the statutory" unconscionability standard, the lawmaker has declared the
standard although it is apparent that judicial interpretation as to what that
standard means will have the net result that the court is a co-declarant of the
standard. With respect to consequences, the consequence of "unconscionability" is limited to the civil side of the law. In the absence of a statute, such
as a consumer protection statute, expressly imposing a criminal penalty upon
the making of an "unconscionable contract," it is not a crime to make an unconscionable contract.4
43 See, e.g., Blount v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 432 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970)
Martin v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 224 Ga. 550, 163 S.E.2d 885 (1970). Annot., 18
A.L.R.3d 1305, 1307 (1969).
44 This adjective is included to distinguish the statutory unconscionability concept from
the traditional equity chancellor concept. This distinction is not always maintained and some
courts, encouraged by the existence of the statutory standard, have been willing to find that
there always was a common-law principle equivalent to the statutory standard. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
45 Note that it may also be observed that the civil consequence of unconscionability may
follow a more flexible pattern than when the contract is condemned as contrary to public
policy. Generally in the latter situation, the court views the contract on an "all or none"
basis. The statutory unconscionability provisions permit a court to edit a contract to eliminate
the unconscionable aspect when this may be done, with the result that there is still remaining
a binding, although modified, contract between the parties.
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The courts have been quick to pick up the authority given by the statutory
concept of unconscionability. As stated by one court:
[T]he law is beginning to fight back against those who once took advantage
of the poor and illiterate without risk of either exposure or interference....
We have, over the years, developed common and statutory law which tells
not only the buyer but also the seller to beware. This body of law recognizes
the importance of a free enterprise system but at the same time will provide
the legal armor to protect and safeguard the prospective victim from the
harshness of an unconscionable contract. Section 2-302 of the Uniform
Commercial Code enacts the
moral sense of the community into the law
46
of commercial transactions.
American courts have traditionally taken the view that competent adults
may make contracts on their own terms, provided they are neither illegal nor
contrary to public policy; and that in the absence of fraud, mistake, or duress,
a party who has voluntarily entered into a contract is bound thereby, notwithstanding it was unwise, improvident, or disadvantageous for him to do so. Traditionally the courts have declared that a contract cannot be challenged because
of inadequacy of consideration. The unconscionability concept is in conflict
with these traditional rules of contract law, particularly when applied to condemn excessively high prices.4" One case has recently been decided which purports to continue the concept of the earlier consumer protection unconscionability decisions but which may well mark a turning point and retreat by the
courts.
In Morris v. Capitol Furniture& Appliance Co.,4" the sales price was held
not unconscionable because the buyer could have gone elsewhere, and therefore
had a meaningful choice in the transaction. Specifically, household goods costing a seller $234.50, exclusive of freight, delivery, commissions and overhead
were sold to a consumer under a contract giving her the choice of paying cash
or paying in weekly installments for 2 years. The cash price was $594.85, plus
a sales tax of $17.85. If payment was made in weekly installments of $12.00,
a "credit charge" of $219.30 was added, making a total credit sales price of
$832.00. The buyer claimed that the credit price was unconscionable because
there was more than a 100% markup. The lower court rejected this conclusion
on the ground that "since this contract was a new and independent one, defendant was free to indulge in comparative shopping. Consequently, an essential
element of unconscionability, that is, '[t]he absence of meaningful choice' was
not present in the instant case. . . ."" The appellate court quoted the lower
court, apparently with approval, commented on the fact that the buyer had not
46 Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1969). Note that
in some instances the unconscionability provisions permit a court to avoid contracts or contract terms in "near fraud" cases without the necessity of determining whether fraud is
actually present-something which might be virtually impossible or very expensive to prove
in today's world. By finding that there is "unconscionability" when the facts are "near fraud,"
the court in effect liberates a consumer plaintiff from the burden of proving fraud by a preponderance of the evidence.
47 1 ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 402-03 (1970).
48 280 A.2d 775 (D.C. App. 1971).
49 Id. at 776.
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presented "evidence of the commercial setting, purpose and effect of this contract which would lead the court to a finding of unconscionability," 50 and affirmed the action of the lower court.
What does the comparative shopping concept mean? Is it not equally true
that in the other "unconscionable price" cases the buyer could have engaged
in comparative shopping? What does the term "meaningful choice" mean?
When is it absent? If the buyer would be faced with similar price patterns in
all other stores in the same geographic area would the buyer still have had a
meaningful choice? If the buyer does not have the money to buy for cash from
either the seller or from someone else, is there a "meaningful choice"?
Note the similarity between the problem here involved and that in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,5 in which the court was greatly influenced by the fact
that even if the buyer had gone elsewhere he would have been met by the same
warranty exclusion regardless of where he purchased his automobile. Note
likewise the similarity between the problem involved and the concept of "adhesion contracts." Does the law say that an insurance policy is not a contract of adhesion merely because the insured was not compelled to procure the particular
policy or because he could have gone elsewhere?
What does "meaningful choice" mean? If we adhere to the traditional
common-law concepts and the policy of free enterprise, "meaningful choice"
exists as long as there has not been any deception or coercion. If we are solicitous
as to the buyer's interests, it could be said that "meaningful choice" does not
exist unless the buyer has the economic power to give effect to his volitional
choice. It is most unlikely, however, that American society is willing to condemn
a transaction as involuntary merely because the buyer could not afford to do
what he wanted to do, that is, to buy elsewhere or for cash. With respect to the
future development of the concept of unconscionability, it should be recognized
that the contracts condemned in the decisions preceding the Morris case, because the price charged was unconscionable, could for the most part have been
sustained on the terminology of the Morris case. Ignoring those unconscionability cases which contained an element of fraud or near fraud, the remaining cases which condemned excessive prices because they were unconscionable presented just as much freedom to engage in comparative shopping and
the buyer's choice was just as meaningful as in the Morris case. Yet a highprice markup was deemed not controlling in the Morris case because of the comparative shopping and meaningful choice elements.
Whether viewed from a legalistic or a socio-economic point of view, there
is much cause to lament the rise of a pattern by which courts under U.C.C. §
2-302 determine whether a price is proper.
Without regard to the ultimate decision made by a court, I would be much
more impressed by a decision as to whether a price is "excessive," if I could
perceive on what basis or ground the conclusion was reached that the price was
excessive. Is the mathematical difference between the cash price and the time
price the sole criterion? It would seem that someone should consider the degree
50
51

Id.
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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of risk attendant upon credit selling. The greater the number of transactions
in which the seller sustains a loss, the greater is the "overhead" of selling, and
prices must be increased by the seller either as to all buyers or as to the credit
buyers. What is the administrative overhead cost of credit sales? If the buyer
pays weekly installments over two years, there are 104 entries to be made on
the seller's records. How much does this cost the seller? For many years it has
often been said and accepted without challenge that a large enterprise cannot
afford to send a bill or a letter with respect to a matter under $5.00 because of
the high clerical and overhead costs involved. It would be worthwhile to know
just how much of the credit charge imposed by a credit seller can be justified on
the basis of administrative expense incurred because of the installment payment
pattern. It may very well be that once we eliminate all fraud and deceptive
selling practices found in some of the unconscionability cases, we come down
to the conclusion that the problem basically is "the heavy cost of credit to consumers."52 It is very easy to become emotionally aroused over the plight of the
poor consumer being exploited by the avaricious and greedy time seller. We
can readily agree that such practices are not to be permitted. But how do we
make the determination that a price is too much? And, how do we know what
the price should be? How much of the credit price is consumed by overhead
and bad risks? After the net profit is determined, how do we know when it is
too much? How can we evaluate it as excessive or not excessive without establishing criteria applicable to cash sales as well as credit sales and without regard
to the economic position of the buyer? Or do we contemplate a society in which
one rate of profit is deemed proper in selling to those in higher income brackets
but not when the buyer is in a lower income bracket? Are we willing to impose
upon the merchant seller a legal obligation to do that which professional men
have for many years done voluntarily: charge the poor clients smaller fees or
never bothering to collect their bill?
Extensive research to obtain basic data must be made. Then policy decisions of far-reaching societal consequence must be made. One may well question whether a court of law armed with U.G.C. § 2-302 or a similar statutory
provision is the proper body to make that determination and to make it in a
private suit between two private litigants. Private litigation does not ordinarily
produce the impartial data which is needed by society in order to make sound
planning determinations. Likewise, private litigation is complete with the entry
of the final judgment and the expiration of the time for appeal: it is not concerned with the societal consequence of the decision. A citizen, as distinguished
from a litigant, may well ask the question whether judicial monitoring of prices
by way of the unconscionability clause protects consumers generally or whether
it is merely a windfall for a few isolated consumers. If one seller has his economic
knuckles rapped by a court, does he change his price structure? Does he raise
all his prices generally to offset the reduction required by the court's decision?
Does he sell at a nominally lower price but then evade the court's decision by
requiring the credit buyer to make a secret or disguised payment of the amount
of the reduction in price? Does the "industry" reduce its prices or does the
52

Hall v. Coburn Corporation, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281, 259 N.E.2d 720 (1970).
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court's opinion compelling a defendant seller to reduce his price merely force
that one seller to price himself out of the competitive market? Does the seller

make it impossible for certain classes of buyers to obtain goods on credit by
raising his standards for acceptable credit risks in order to offset the "hazards"
of selling at a lower price? If the credit seller is thus stricter, and refuses to sell
to the given consumer, does the consumer go away happy or does he pick up
a stone and throw it through the store window and off we go to another civil
disorder?"3
Before I could say that a decision under U.C.C. § 2-302 is "right" or
"wrong," I would like to have impartial data relating to these questions. Our
economic welfare is too important to be tossed lightly around in a game of "stick
the label 'excessive' on the price tag." What are the realities of our world today?
Let us set aside the game of blindman's buff when we are making determinations of social significance. Let us find out what we are really doing. Research
must take the place of semantics and emotions, yes, and even of traditional approaches and procedures.
F. Protection of the Indigent
The current growth of consumer protection cannot be fully understood
without recognizing a companion element of protection of the indigent-both
of these elements, protection of the consumer, and protection of the indigent,
stemming from the social force of protection of the person. Protection of the
indigent long existed in the form of the criminal court judge's discretionary
authority to appoint counsel to represent an indigent defendant who did not
have an attorney. In 1963, this right of the trial judge was elevated to a duty
so that it became a constitutionally-protected right of the accused to have an
attorney appointed for him at public expense when he was charged with a
serious offense and was unable to pay for a private attorney.5 4
53 Note that consumer dissatisfaction is generally regarded as one of the major causes
of the civil disorders that have devastated many of our major cities in the last several years.
54 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
This had been foreshadowed by Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 '(1938), which had
held that federal courts were required to appoint counsel to represent indigent defendants,
Gideon thereafter extending this obligation of the federal courts to state courts.
There is some authority that a court should appoint an attorney to represent an indigent civil defendant. Hotel Martha Washington Management v. Swinick, 322 N.Y.S.2d 13
(App. Div. N.Y. 1971). The translation or carrying over of criminal concepts to the civil
side has been made in Blair v. Pitchess, discussed in note 68 infra. The citation of civil and
criminal case authority by the U.S. Supreme Court in Boddie v. Connecticut, see note 58
infra, is a further indication of the applicability of the application of criminal law concepts
to civil litigation.
In the Application of Wright, 189 N.W.2d 447 (S.D. 1971), the court adhered to the
rule that a court is not required to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant charged with a
petty offense because extending the right to counsel in such cases "seems to us to bear little
relation to the realities of our society," for "If such offenders are given the right to appointed
counsel, to whom can it be reasonably denied?" The concern of the court is well-taken but
it reveals clearly that the limitation of the Gideon rule to serious offenses is dictated by
practical expediency. In effect it is an application of the old maxim de minimis non curat lex
to the field of personal rights. As a matter of abstract analysis, it is difficult to exclude the
protection of some rights because of the "realities" of modern society. It may well be that
society will recognize that abstractly every defendant in both civil and criminal litigation
should be represented by counsel but then, having in mind the expense of and the problem
of the availability of counsel, may refuse to adhere literally to the theoretical premise and
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The concept of protection of the indigent was then expanded so that now
the recipient of welfare payments is entitled to a hearing before such payments
may be terminated on the ground of the recipient's disqualification.55 Likewise,
a state welfare law may not impose residence qualifications or exclude from
benefits aliens generally or aliens who have not resided within the state for a
long period of time, such as 15 years.5 " A judge cannot impose a sentence of
"$30.00 or 30 days," on the theory that such sentence discriminates against the
defendant who does not have $30.00." A plaintiff seeking a divorce cannot
be required to pay court costs in advance where the effect of such requirement,
because of the indigence of the plaintiff, is to deny the plaintiff the right to sue
for a divorce.58 When a debtor has been discharged in bankruptcy, his state
license to operate an automobile cannot be revoked under a state financial responsibility act when such revocation is based upon the non-satisfaction of a
judgment which was discharged in bankruptcy.5 9
The concept of protecting the indigent shades off into procedural protection
of the debtor and gives such modem decisions as those holding that due process
of law prohibits a prejudgment attachment of wages,60 a prejudgment attachment of the debtor's property generally, 6 a seizure by a hotel of property for
a debt owed by a guest-the historical landlord's lien,62 the seizure by a landlord of property of the tenant because of overdue rent-the landlord's distraint.63
Appeals are now pending in the United States Supreme Court to determine
whether a contract authorizing a creditor to confess judgment against a debtor
upon his default is valid;64 whether a secured creditor can repossess collateral
upon the default of the debtor without prior notice and hearing as to his right
to repossess;65 and whether a state can require an indigent person for whom the
court has appointed an attorney to indemnify the state for such expense.66 Apaccept as a compromise the obligation to appoint counsel only for persons accused of the more
serious criminal offenses.
55 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
56 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968). A municipal housing authority cannot
make a period of local residence a condition for admission to a government housing project.
King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971).
57 Short v. Tate, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
58 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). The opinion of the Court purports to
limit its applicability to divorce actions on the theory that a state after requiring the use of
its courts to obtain a divorce cannot shut the doors of the court to a person merely because
of indigence. This is an unsound restriction as equal protection requires that no barrier exclude the indigent from any court in any action. This view is recognized by a concurring
opinion and is implicit in the Court's citation of a criminal law case as support for its decision
in a divorce case, such citing recognizing that there is no valid distinction between one type
of judicial proceeding and another for the purpose of determining the effect of indigence.
59 Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
60 Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
61 Randone v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13 (1971); Jones Press, Inc.
v. Motor Travel Services, Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970); Larson v. Fetherston,
44 Wis. 2d 712. 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969).
An appeal to determine the validity of the Connecticut prejudgment attachment statute
is now pending in the United States Supreme Court. Tucker v. Maher, No. 70-249.
62 Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
63 Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Sellers v. Contino, 327 F.
Supp. 230 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Gray v. Whitmore, 17 Cal. App. 3d, 94 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1971).
64 D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick, No. 69-5; Swarb v. Lennox, No. 70-6.
65 Fuentes v. Faircloth, No. 70-5039.
66 James v. Strange, No. 71-11.
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parently no one has yet raised the question of whether a clause giving the creditor
power to accelerate the debt upon default is valid, as against the contention
that there must be a notice and hearing as to the existence of a default before
there can be an acceleration on the basis that there was a default. Should such
a limitation be recognized, its application will be most interesting when the
acceleration clause gives the creditor the right to accelerate when he deems himself insecure or to accelerate "at will."8 7
Returning to the adjudicated cases, it has also been held that a replevin
plaintiff in a state court action cannot obtain possession of the claimed property
without first showing the existence of probable cause comparable to that required
for the issuance of a search warrant.68 Courts adopting this conclusion take the
position that a provision in a security agreement expressly authorizing the creditor to repossess the property does not alter the conclusion, relying on the theory
that such a provision is in the nature of an adhesion clause which should not
be held binding and in any event which is to be construed as authorizing repossession only by the seller, and not authorizing the entry of an officer or public
employee acting under a court writ. It would appear that ultimately the requirement of notice and hearing will be extended to invalidate all summary remedies
of a creditor, whether by entering a judgment by confession, taking possession
of property, or enforcing a lien on property in the creditor's possession. The fact
that a procedure has been long-rooted in the past is no assurance of its future
validity.
III. The Process of Governing
A. Jurisdiction
The concept of physical presence as an essential element for jurisdiction in
personam has been supplemented to permit the exercise of such jurisdiction over
a nonresident when he makes a contract or commits a tortious act within the
state, even though it is a single act or contract, or when he engages in business
within that state. Under some statutes it is sufficient that he derive economic
benefit from commercial activities within the state although the nonresident did
not actually participate in such transactions, as when the nonresident defendant
6
sold goods to a middleman who sold the goods in the forum state. " This is a
67 U.C.C. § 1-208 recognizes the validity of such clauses, imposing only the requirement
that such a power be exercised in good faith and placing upon the debtor the burden of
proving the nonexistence of good faith.
in
68 Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 486 P.2d 1242 (1971)
order to create a constitutional prejudgment replevin remedy, there must be a provision for

a determination of probable cause by a magistrate and for a hearing prior to any seizure,

except in those few instances where important state or creditor interests justify summary
process. . . . Obviously, the affidavits customarily required of those initiating [such actions]
do not satisfy the probable cause standard. Such affidavits need allege only that the plaintiff
owns property which the defendant is wrongfully detaining. The affiants are not obliged to
set forth facts showing probable cause to believe such allegations to be true, nor must they
show probable cause to believe that the property is at the location specified in the process.
Finally, such affidavits fail to comply with the probable cause standard because they are not
passed upon by a magistrate. . . ."); Laprease Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716
(E.D.N.Y. 1970). Contra, Brunswick Corp. v. J. & P., Inc. 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970);
Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
69 Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961)
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very practical and logical extension of the concept of the nonresident motorist
service statutes first sustained in 1927.0 It is, however, a far cry from the basic
concept of jurisdiction as the exercise of power by the sovereign over the person
of the defendant.7 Still further removed is the extension of the long-arm concept to permit service in New York, the forum state, upon a West German cor72
poration with respect to a cause of action arising in West Germany.
The net result of the long-arm concept is to permit the process of a court
to run anywhere in the world, granted the existence of sufficient contacts of the
defendant with the forum state to satisfy the concept of due process. Such "contacts" are being increasingly found in the obtaining of economic benefit from
the forum state, as distinguished from physical presence or the doing of an act
therein.
B. The Federal Welfare Power
One of the most incredible changes that has taken place in the third of
the twentieth century under consideration has been the rise of the federal general welfare power. Admittedly the written Constitution does not grant any
general welfare power and the legal historian will recall that the early New
Deal reform laws of President Roosevelt were held unconstitutional because
the Court then deemed them not sustainable as an exercise of the granted federal
powers. Beginning with the decision of N.L.R.B. v.Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.,7" sustaining the validity of the Wagner Labor Relations Act of 1935, the
Court began an expansion of the commerce power which by 1946 permitted
the Court to say that by virtue of the commerce power "Congress can effectively
deal with problems concerning the welfare of the national economy. . . . We
reaffirm once more the constitutional authority resident in Congress by virtue
of the commerce power to undertake to solve national problems directly and
realistically... that follows from the fact that the federal commerce power is as
broad as the economic needs of the nation. . ... 1
As indicating that Congress is in fact regulating the general welfare, by
whatever legal theory it may be constitutionality sustained, consider the follow-

(defendant made component part of product purchased by resident); Parke-Benet Galleries
v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 256 N.E.2d 506 (1977); 1 ANDERSON, supra note 47, at 549-50.
See also International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
70 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
71 Compare Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
72 Delagi v. Volkswagen AG, 317 N.Y.S.2d 881 (App. Div. N.Y. 1971).
73 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
74 American Power & Light Co. v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, 329 U.S. 90
(1946). It is worth noting that in that case the Court sustained the federal death sentence
for improper utility holding companies, concluding that such holding companies came within
the reach of the federal commerce power because the holding company systems used interstate channels of communication to promote investment. Does this mean that all phases of
economic activity can be regulated by the federal government as long as they use interstate
communication?
This is fairly the tail wagging the dog. If use of interstate means of communication
for promotion of enterprise activities is a sufficient basis on which to rest an exercise of the
federal interstate commerce power, it would necessarily follow that every business that utilizes
mail, telephone, radio, or television for either advertising or the actual conduct of the enterprise becomes "interstate commerce." It would appear that there would not be much remaining outside of the sphere of federal power.
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ing statutes adopted by Congress in 1970.7, It is very important to bear in mind
that most of the statutes are the result of popular demand and thus were either
authorized or ratified by the sovereign people."8 The general welfare nature and
objective of the following statutes is emphasized by the committee reports presented to Congress in support of the various statutes, the intent of Congress
being clearly to regulate the general welfare, without any great concern over
the legal theory or "constitutionality" of such federal action. The statutes include:

School Lunch Program, 7
Public Health Training Act,"
Medical Library Assistance Extension Act of 1970,"'
Commission on Population Growth and the American Future,"
Saline Water Conversion Program,"
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969,82
Elementary, Secondary and Other Educational Amendments of 1969,"s
75 These statutes are listed merely in the sequence of adoption. This serves to give a
better appreciation of the bewildering "all over the lot" aspect of running a modem society.
76 It is curious that what public protest one hears, such as that against involvement in
foreign wars, is directed at federal action within areas in which the federal government has
undoubted power to act. I was about to write that one does not hear of voters dissenting
from federal crime control or consumer protection on the ground of lack of power of the
federal government nor manifest disapproval as by dumping tea in the Boston Harbor. How
times have changed! Today the Boston Tea Parby would be held a violation of the Federal
Refuse Matter Act of 1899 as a pollution of the ocean.
77 Pub. L. No. 91-207, 84 Stat. 51. ...... for the purpose of providing free or reducedprice meals to needy children not now being reached . . .to improve the nutrition of needy
children in public and non-profit schools participating in the national school lunch and school
breakfast programs.... ." S. REP. No. 91-707. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nnws 248 (1970).
78 Pub. L. No. 91-208, 84 Stat. 52. "Advancing urbanization and acceptance of public
responsibility for new health services to the population have expanded the need for personnel
trained in protecting the public health. For many years agencies concerned with community
health programs have been faced by shortages of professional personnel with public health
training -

including physicians, nurses, and sanitarians ....

To meet the need for training

more public health personnel, many educational institutions-such as schools of public health,
engineering and nursing; departments of preventive medicine and dentistry; and other institutions which provide special public health training - must continue to expand their enrollment
capacity. Such expansion will require additional highly specialized faculty and supportive
staff. .. ." S. REP. No. 91-586, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2491 (1970).
79 Pub. L. No. 91-212, 84 Stat. 63. ". . . to amend the Public Health Service Act to improve and extend the provisions to provide for a program of assistance for medical library and
other health information services and facilities...." S. REp. No. 91-480, 2 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2527 (1970).

80 Pub. L. No. 91-213, 84 Stat. 67. To "establish a Commission on Population Growth
and .the American Future to conduct and sponsor studies and research and make necessary
recommendations regarding a broad range of problems associated with population growth and
their implication for America's future ... " H.R. REp. No. 91-738, 2 U.S. CoD CONG. &
AD.NEws 2540 (1970).

81 Pub. L. No. 91-221, 84 Stat. 87. "The purpose of the bill is to authorize an appropriation to continue the desalting research program of the Office of Saline Water, Department of
the Interior." H.R. RP. No. 91-858, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2646 (1970).
82 Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87. "The purpose of this bill is to provide adequate warning to the public of the hazards of cigarette smoking through strengthened cautionary labeling
of all cigarette packages and to prohibit after January 1, 1971, all television and radio broadcasting of cigarette advertisements." S. REp. No. 91-566, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nnws
2652 '(1970).
83 Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121. ... to extend programs of assistance for elementary
and secondary education...." S. RaP. No. 91-634, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 2768
(1970).
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Expansion of the School Lunch Program, 8
Child Nutrition--Special Milk Program,"
Medical Facilities Construction and Modernization Amendments of
1970,88
Public Works and Economic Development,"1
National Commission on Libraries and Information Science Act, 8
National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Amendments of
1970, s8
Sea Grant Colleges Appropriations Extension,"
Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970,"'
Newspaper Preservation Act (granting anti-trust exemption to operating
agreements entered into to prevent financial collapse),"
84 Pub. L. No. 91-248, 84 Stat. 214. "... to clarify responsibilities related to providing
free and reduced-price meals and preventing discrimination against children, to revise program matching requirements, to strengthen the nutrition training and education benefits of
the programs, and otherwise strengthen the food service programs for children in schools and
service institutions ... ." H.R. REP. No. 91-81, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3014 (1970).
85 Pub. L. No. 91-295, 84 Stat. 336. To extend ". . . a special milk program designed
to encourage increased milk consumption by children. The program also helps maintain a
healthy fluid dairy economy by expanding the market for fluid milk. .. " S. Rap. No. 91-842,
2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3328 (1970).
86 Pub. L. No. 91-296, 84 Stat. 336. To "extend . . . the present program of grants to
States for construction and modernization of hospitals and other health facilities ..
" S.
REP. No. 91-657, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3332 (1970).
87 Pub. L. No. 91-304, 84 Stat. 375. To extend earlier laws to "provide Federal help,
in cooperation with the States, to assist communities, areas, and regions in the United States
which are suffering from excessive unemployment or underemployment by providing financial
and technical assistance needed for the creating of new jobs. Its emphasis is on long-range
planning and programming for economic development with the objective of enhancing the
domestic prosperity by the establishment of stable and diversified local economies. This is
accomplished by expanding new and existing public works, providing loans for businesses,
and technical assistance necessary to create directly or indirectly new opportunities for longterm employment and economic growth." S. REP. No. 91-284, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3393 (1970).
88 Pub. L. No. 91-345, 84 Stat. 440. "...
to establish a national commission on libraries
and information sciences . . . to make a comprehensive study and appraisal of the role of libraries as resources for scholarly pursuits, and centers for the dissemination of knowledge, and
as components of the evolving national information systems . . . to develop recommendations
for action by Government or private institutions and organizations designed to ensure an
effective and efficient system for the Nation." S. REP. No. 91-196, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3452 (1970).
89 Pub. L. No. 91-346, 84 Stat. 443. "The Committee [on Labor and Public Welfare]
recognizes the growing appreciation of the arts and the humanities by citizens across the Nation and urges the Endowments to continue their efforts to decentralize American art and
culture and emphasize those programs that will stimulate the creation of new cultural institutions and strengthen established ones in local communities. States and regions. By further
integrating the arts and humanities into the mainstream of American life, increased opportunities for broader appreciation of them will be created.
S. REP. No. 91-879, 2 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3496 (1970).
90 Pub. L. No. 91-349, 84 Stat. 448. "Extending the National Sea Grant College and
Program Act of 1966 . . . which came at a time of growing national interest in the marine
resources of the country, and at a time of increasing awareness of the national benefits to be
derived from fuller and more knowledgeable development and use of those resources." S. REP.
No. 91-894, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3473 (1970).
91 Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 450. Based on the premise "that economic conditions in
this Nation are approaching a critical level, and that immediate action is necessary if we are to
avoid a further drop in the economy and possibly a serious recession by the end of the year."
S. REp. No. 91-761, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3489 (1970).
92 Pub. L. No. 91-353, 84 Stat. 466. Section 2 of the Act declares that "in the public
interest of maintaining a newspaper press editorially and reportorially independent and competitive in all parts of the United States, it is hereby declared to be the public policy of the
United States to preserve the publication of newspapers in any city, community, or metropolitan
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National Science Foundation Authorization Act of 1971,"
Employment Security Amendments of 1970,"4
Youth Conservation Corps Act,"5
Economic Stabilization Act of 1970,9'
Fisheries Loan Program Act,97
Institutional Investors Act,9
Coral Reefs Conservation Act,9 9
Wheat Research and Promotion Act,100
Emergency Community Facilities Act of 1970,10"
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,02

Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1970,"03
area where a joint operating arrangement has been hitherto entered into because of economic
distress or is hereafter effected in accordance with the provisions of this Act."
93 Pub. L. No. 91-356, 84 Stat. 471. This Act "provides basic support for development of
fundamental knowledge in all scientific fields and disciplines. This knowledge and basic capability are needed to meet the challenge of maintaining a viable and growing and technologically
based physical and social environment." S. REP. No. 91-983, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3567 (1970).
94 Pub. L. No. 91-373, 84 Stat. 695, extending the unemployment compensation program
which "has provided a continuing income to millions of men and women in periods of unemployment. The program has also added a stability to the national economy that has moderated,
and on occasion perhaps even averted, economic recession." S. REP. No. 91-752, 2 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEws 3606 (1970).
95 Pub. L. No. 91-378, 84 Stat. 794. "Designed to provide summer employment opportunities for youth, primarily those from urban areas, who have varying economic, social and
racial backgrounds. . . . More than a year ago, the President's National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders reported that the lack of substantial employment opportunities for the
youth trapped in urban ghettos was one of the principal causes of riots. The youth of these
areas were characterized as encountering a life of despair and hopelessness. . . . The Youth
Conservation Corps would reach many of these young men and women and demonstrate to
them that they can play a significant role in the functioning of our society ... ." S. REP. No.
91-270, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.Naws 3755 (1970).
96 Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 796, Title II of the Defense Production Act.
97 Pub. L. No. 91-387, 84 Stat. 829. ..... to extend an existing program to provide financial assistance to commercial fishermen." H.R. REP. No. 91-1273, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD.NEws 3797 (1970).
98 Pub. L. No. 91-410, 84 Stat. 862, extending "the reporting date for the institutional
investors' study presently being prepared by the Securities and Exchange Commission." H.R.
REP. No. 91-1418, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 3847 (1970).
99 Pub. L. No. 91-427, 84 Stat. 884, authorizing expenditures for research to protect coral
reefs from destruction by the Starfish Crown of Thorns. ". . . in addition to providing a habitat
and food source for fish, the living coral reefs bffer protection . . . during tropical storms.
If the coral dies, and begins to erode the islands become susceptible to erosion and other damage caused by typhoons." H.R. RP. No. 91-1406, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3933
(1970).
100 Pub. L. No. 91-430, 84 Stat. 85. "...
to carry out a program of research and promotion designed to expand the domestic and foreign markets and increase utilization for U.S.
wheat...." S. REP. No. 91-1203, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3943 (1970).
101 Pub. L. No. 91-431, 84 Stat. 886. To "(1) state congressional findings that many of
the Nation's communities are unable to finance the construction of urgently needed public
facilities and that there is an immediate need for such facilities to provide basic safeguards for
the health and well-being of our citizens, to check widespread water pollution, and to provide
an effective and practical method of combating rising unemployment; (2) to re-enact the balance of the authorization for basic water and sewer facilities provided for in Title VII of
the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 and provide for an additional authorization
of $1,000,000,000.00; and (3) extend for 1 year . . . the time within which a community
may qualify for a basic water and sewer facilities grant... " H.R. REP. No. 91-1263, 2 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3947 (1970).
102 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922.
103 Pub. L. No. 91-453, 84 Stat. 962. ...
to provide long-term financing for expanded
urban mass transportation programs ... " H.R. REP. No. 91-1264, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Nzws 4092 (1970).
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Communicable Disease Control Amendments of 1970,104
Credit Union Insurance Act, 0 5
Federal Aid in Wildlife and Fish Restoration,'"
Resource Recovery Act of 1970,1- 7
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,108
Public Health Service Act Amendments," 9
Environmental Education Act," 0
Developmental Disability Services and Facilities Construction Amendments of 1970,"'
2
Health Training Improvement Act of 1970,1
Almonds Marketing Orders Act,"'
Pub. L. No. 91-464, 84 Stat. 988. ". . to provide authorization for grants for com." H.R. REP. No. 91-1114, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
4135 (1970).
105 Pub. L. No. 91-468, 84 Stat. 994. "...
to give credit unions the same insurance
afforded other federally chartered financial institutions..
." hR. RzP. No. 91-1457, 2 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4166 (1970).
106 Pub. L. No. 91-503, 84 Stat. 1097. ".
to encourage comprehensive planning by
State Fish and Game Departments, to increase the revenues available to the States for wildlife restoration projects, and to provide funds to be used by the States to carry out programs
supporting hunter safety." S. REP. No. 91-1289, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4353
(1970).
107 Pub. L. No. 91-512, 84 Stat. 1227, amending "the Solid Waste Disposal Act in order
to provide financial assistance for the construction of solid waste disposal facilities, to improve
research programs pursuant to such Act, . . . (1) to expand and intensify the development of
new technologies for solid waste disposal; (2) to promote greater initiative on the part of
the States in assuming increasing responsibilities for solid waste disposal programs ... " H.R.
REP. No. 91-1155, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 4553 (1970).
108 Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236. ". . . to provide increased research into, and prevention of, drug abuse and drug dependence; to provide for treatment and rehabilitation
of drug abusers and drug dependent persons; and to strengthen existing law enforcement authority in the field of drug abuse ... " H.R. REP. No. 91-1444, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEws 4566 (1970).
109 Pub. L. No. 91-515, 84 Stat. 1297 extending "the existing program known as Regional
Medical Programs, under which grants are made for local based programs designed to improve
the diagnosis, care, and treatment of heart disease, cancer, and stroke" and expanding the
programs "to cover kidney disease." H.R. REP. No. 91-127, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEws 4678 '(1970).
110 Pub. L. No. 91-516, 84 Stat. 1312. "[R]ecently it has become apparent to many ...
that the ever-increasing rate of using resources, and the pollution which results from this use,
might result in the destruction rather than the enhancement of the quality of the Nation's
environment. If the people of the United States are to develop these resources in a creative
and nondestructive manner, they must have the knowledge and insight that will enable them
to take into account the environmental consequences of the decisions that they make. The Environmental Quality Education Act . . . is designed to assist in providing the public with this
knowledge and insight. . . . Every phase of education, from preschool through adult and
continuing education, must be re-ordered to permit the introduction of ecological understanding." S. REP. No. 91-1164, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4704 (1970).
111 Pub. L. No. 91-517, 84 Stat. 1316. ". . . to assist the States in developing a plan for
the provision of comprehensive services to persons affected by mental retardation and other
developmental disabilities originating in childhood, to assist the States in the provision of
such services . . . to 4ssist in the construction of such facilities to provide the services needed
to carry out such plan ... " H.R. REP. No. 91-1277, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4714
(1970).
112 Pub. L. No. 91-519, 84 Stat. 1342. ". . . to amend Title VII of the Public Health
Service Act to establish eligibility of new schools of medicine, dentistry, osteopathy, pharmacy, optometry, veterinary medicine, and podiatry for institutional grants under Section
771 thereof, to extend and improve the program relating to training of personnel in the allied
health professions. . . ." S. REP. No. 91-1002, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4755 (1970).
113 Pub. L. No. 91-522, 84 Stat. 1357, to authorize marketing research and promotion
projects including paid advertising for almonds.
104

municable disease control...
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Agricultural Act of 1970,11
Drug Abuse Education Act of 1970,"'
Horse Protection Act of 1970,116
Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970,1"
Small Business Act Amendments," 8
Water Bank Act, 9
Atomic Energy Utilization for Industrial or Commercial Purposes,"
Investor Protection, 21
Peanut Marketing Quotas,'2 2
s

°

Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970,12

114 Pub. L. No. 91-524, 84 Stat. 1358. "... to establish improved programs for the benefit of producers and consumers of dairy products, wool, wheat, feed grains, cotton and other

commodities . . . to assure consumers of abundant supplies of food and fiber at fair and
reasonable prices. It would protect farm prices and income, provide for expanding markets at
home and abroad, minimize Government costs, and provide administrative flexibility to assure
workability of programs." S. REP. No. 91-1154, 3 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEws 4788 (1970).
115 Pub. L. No. 91-527, 84 Stat. 1385. "... . to make grants to conduct special educational
programs and activities concerning the use of drugs and for other related educational purposes. ... " S. REP. No. 91-1244, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4843 (1970).
116 Pub. L. No. 91-540, 84 Stat. 1404. ". . . to end the inhumane practice of deliberately
making sore the feet of Tennessee walking horses in order to alter their natural gait ...
Prohibiting the shipment of any horse in commerce, for showing or exhibition, which a
person has reason to believe is sored; . . . making unlawful the exhibiting of a sored horse in
any horse show or exhibition in which that horse or any other horse was moved in commerce;
. . . prohibiting the holding of any horse show in which a sored horse is exhibited if any of
the horses in that show were moved in commerce." H.R. REP. No. 91-1597, 3 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4870 (1970).
117 Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413. ". .. to define the equitable standards governing
relationships between investment companies and their investment advisors and principal
underwriters. . . ." S. REP. No. 91-184, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 4897 (1970).
118 Pub. L. No. 91-558, 84 Stat. 1468. ". . . to increase . . . the amount of loans, guarantees, and commitments which can be outstanding at any time from the business loan and
investment fund of the Small Business Administration." S. REP. No. 91-1366, 2 U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEWs 2970 (1970).
119 Pub. L. No. 91-559, 84 Stat. 1468. To authorize "the Secretary of Agriculture to
enter in 10-year renewable contracts with landowners and operators in important migratory
water fowl nesting and breeding areas for the conservation of water on specified wetlands."
S. REP. No. 91-1393, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4974 (1970).
120 Pub. L. No. 91-560, 84 Stat. 1472:
121 Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497. To "provide additional investor protection in
corporate tender offers and other acquisitions of securities, and . . . supplement the protections afforded to investors by Public Law 90-439 [amending the Securities Exchange Act of
1934]." H.R. REP. No. 91-1655, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5025 (1970).
122 Pub. L. No. 91-568, 84 Stat. 1499. ". . . to amend the Peanut Marketing Quota
provisions.... There are many peanut acreage allotments too small to constitute an economic
unit in view of rising costs of producing and harvesting peanuts... . Much greater mechanization in the production of peanuts involves the use of very expensive equipment, herbicides,
and improved methods of cultivation. This simply means that the cost per acre of producing
peanuts is going up. Therefore, in many cases, farmers need to increase their peanut acreage
allotment in order to realize a reasonable return on their tremendous investment." H.R. REp.
No. 91-164, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 5034-35 (1970).
123 Pub. L. No. 91-572, 84 Stat. 1504. '€... to improve and expand the availability of
family planning services and information to all persons desiring such; to assure the coordination, supervision, administration, and evaluation of domestic family planning services and
population research activities with regard to present and future programs; to enable public and
nonprofit private entities to plan and develop comprehensive service programs; to provide for
the development and to make readily available information concerning family planning and
the dynamics of population growth; to assist in expanding the availability of trained manpower
needed to carry out these objectives; and to establish an Office of Population Affairs in the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare as a primary focus within the Federal Government on matters pertaining to population research and family planning." H.R. REP. No.
91-1472, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 5068 (1970).
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Plant Variety Protection Act, 2 '
Animal Welfare Act of 1970,25
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,128
1 2
Vocational Rehabilitation Program Extension, 1
Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment
and Rehabilitation Act of 1970,n8
Emergency Health Personnel Act of 1970,121
Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970,"'
Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970,31
Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies
Act of 1970,12
3
Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970,1
4
1
Milk, Tomatoes and Potatoes Promotion,
124 Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542. ". . . to encourage the development of novel
varieties of ... plants and to make them available to the public, providing protection available
to those who breed, develop, or discover them, and thereby promoting progress in agriculture
in the public interest. . ." H.R. RiEP. No. 91-1605, 3 U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. Naws 5082
(1970).
125 Pub. L. No. 91-579, 84 Stat. 1560. "...
to amend the Act of August 24, 1966,
relating to the care of certain animals used for purposes of research, experimentation, and
exhibition, or held for sale as pets."
126 Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590. "...
to authorize the Secretary of Labor to set
standards to assure safe and healthful working conditions for working men and women, to
assist and encourage States to participate in efforts to assure such working conditions, to
provide for research, information, education, and training in the field of occupational safety
and health... ." S. REP. No. 91-1282, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.Naws 5177 (1970).
127 Pub. L. No. 91-610, 84 Stat. 1817. ". . . to extend for one year the authorization for
programs under the Vocational Rehabilitation Act."
128 Pub. L. No. 91-616, 84 Stat. 1848. ". . . to provide a comprehensive Federal program
for the prevention and treatment of alcohol abuse and alcoholism . . ." H.R. REP. No.
91-1663, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5719 '(1970).
129 Pub. L. No. 91-623, 84 Stat. 1868. ". . . to authorize the assignment of commissioned
officers of the Public Health Service to areas with critical manpower shortages, to encourage
health personnel to practice in areas where shortages of such personnel exist ... " H.R. REP.
No. 91-1662, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ai. NEWS 5775 (1970).
130 Pub. L. No. 91-631, 84 Stat. 1876, declaring "that it is the continuing policy of the
Federal Government in the national interest to foster and encourage private enterprise in
(1) the development of economically sound and stable domestic mining, minerals, metal and
mineral reclamation industries, (2) the orderly and economic development of domestic
mineral resources, reserves, and reclamation of metals and minerals to help assure satisfaction
of industrial, security and environmental needs, (3) mining, mineral, and metallurgical research, including the use and recycling of scrap to promote the wise and efficient use of our
natural and reclaimable mineral resources, and (4) the study and development of methods of
the disposal, control, and reclamation of mineral waste products, and the reclamation of mined
land, so as to lessen any adverse impact of mineral extraction and processing upon the physical
environment that may result from mining or mineral activities."
131 Pub. L. No. 91-644, 84 Stat. 1880. ". . . to make a variety of amendments to Title I of
the Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act of 1968. . . ." S. REP. No. 91-1253, 3 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEws 5804 (1970).
132 Pub. L. No. 91-646, 84 Stat. 1894. "...
establishing a uniform policy for the fair and
equitable treatment of persons who are displaced, or have their real property taken for Federal
and federally assisted programs. The need for such legislation arises from the increasing impact
of Federal and federally assisted programs as such programs have evolved to meet the needs
of a growing and increasingly urban population...." H.R. REP. No. 91-1656, 3 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & Ai. NEws 5914 (1970).
133 Pub. L. No. 91-648, 84 Stat. 1909. "...
to provide grants for the improvement of
States and local personnel administration, to authorize Federal assistance in training State and
local employees, to provide grants to State and local governments for training of their
employees. .. "
134 Pub. L. No. 91-670, 84 Stat. 2040, regulating the advertising of projects as to milk and
tomatoes and potatoes and enabling "potato growers to finance promotion programs to improve
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Food Stamp Act Amendments, 35
Medicare Hospital Standards,13 6 and
Lead-Based Poisoning Prevention Act." 7
It is true that many of the statutes above noted are appropriation laws, and
one can say that the federal government can spend money for a general welfare
program even though it does not have any power to directly regulate the general
welfare. One would have technical support for this position in United States v.
Butler 3 and Helvering v. Davis.'39 Perhaps we should test the practical validity
of this distinction. Assume that you invested a substantial sum of money in a
corporation formed to make television sets and then the board of directors proceeds to spend large sums for the general welfare. Would you as a shareholder
have a legal and moral ground to complain? If you would, why should there
be a different answer because the money you give to the enterprise is involuntarily taken as taxes rather than voluntarily given as an investment? Many, such
as Madison, claimed that the federal government could only spend money with
regard to matters which the federal government could regulate, and therefore
could not spend money for the general welfare. Perhaps in 1970, we can view
this matter in the perspective of history. Almost two centuries ago, a new nation
was formed to exercise the powers delegated to the Congress of the United
States by article I, section 8, of the Constitution. General welfare as we think
of it today was either unknown or was a matter to be left to the states, the local
communities, or the family groups. By the end of the first third of the present
century, our constitutional law was taking the compromise position of permitting the federal government to spend-but not to legislate-for the general welfare. As we go into the final third of this century, the constitutional law is apparently moving the rest of the way to accept by acquiescence, if not direct
holding, that the Congress can regulate the general welfare.
their competitive position and expand their markets for potatoes by increasing consumer acceptance of potatoes and potato products ... " S.-RE. No. 91-416, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 6017 '(1970).
135 Pub. L. No. 91-671, 84 Stat. 2048 "recognizing that limited purchasing power is related
to hunger and malnutrition, [and designed] to assist low-income households to increase their
expenditures for food and to upgrade the quality of their diets. Under it, the eligible households exchange the amount of money they have in spending for food for an alllotment of
coupons of higher monetary value. The difference between the amount the household pays
for the coupons and the value of the coupon allotment-the free coupons-represents the
Federal contribution to the household's increased food purchasing power." H.R. REP. No.
91-1402, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 6027 (1970).
136 Pub. L. No. 91-690, 84 Stat. 2074. Amending the Social Security Act "to modify -the
nursing service requirement and certain other requirements which an institution must meet
in order to qualify as a hospital thereunder so as to make such requirements more realistic
insofar as they apply to small institutions." H.R. R P. No. 91-1676, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6117 (1970).
137 Pub. L. No. 91-695, 84 Stat. 2078. "... to provide Federal financial assistance to help
cities and communities to develop and carry out intensive local programs to eliminate the
causes of lead-based paint poisoning, and local programs to detect and treat incidents of
such poisoning, to establish a Federal demonstration and research program to study the extent
of the lead-based paint poisoning problem and the methods available for lead-based paint
removal, and to prohibit future use of lead-based paint in Federal or federally assisted construction or rehabilitation.... S. REP. No. 91-1432, 3 U. S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 6130
(1970).
138 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
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Many statutes are still carefully drawn to speak in terms of "affecting [interstate] commerce." This has the magical effect of transforming what to the ordinary observer would appear to be local activity into conduct within the reach
of the federal interstate commerce power as interpreted in the Jones & Laughlin
Steel Company case. By applying this concept, one bypasses the earlier concept
of interstate commerce as the translation of goods, persons, or intelligence across
a state line.14
The diminished or non-existent utility of the concept of "in or affecting
interstate commerce" may also be seen in the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970." While the definitions section begins by rendering lip service to
the concept, by defining "employer" as "a person engaged in a business affecting
[interstate] commerce who has employees ...""' and "employee" as "an employee of an employer who is employed in the business of his employer which
affects [interstate] commerce,"' -" the Act then proceeds to get down to its declared purpose and broadly defines "occupational safety and health standards"
in terms of being "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment."' 44 The Secretary of Labor is then
authorized to promulgate occupational safety and health standards. 4" Neither
the definition of such standards nor the grant of authority to the Secretary of
Labor bothers to refer to the limiting concept of "in or affecting interstate commerce." By standard principles of statutory construction, the Act could be interpreted as though the sections defining "occupational health standards" and
granting the power to the Secretary of Labor expressly confined such definition
and grant of power to places of employment in industries "affecting interstate
commerce." I doubt whether this question will ever be raised because I cannot
conjure up a hypothetical situation in which there will be a health hazard sufficient to come to the attention of the Secretary of Labor or sufficient to attract
the attention of those charged with the enforcement of his regulations which
would not satisfy the concept of "affecting" interstate commerce under the
concept that began with the Jones & Laughlin Steel Company case.' 46 Conceivably, if you hire a man to cut down the tree in your back yard, 4 7 and you
employ him to convert the tree into clothespins which you sell to your neighbors,
we might have a situation of employment which does not "affect interstate
commerce." What percentage of American industry can withdraw itself from
140

Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
It is interesting to note the way in which the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 '(1941), in reversing Hammer v.Dagenhart, in effect indicated
that anyone who had relied on that case was somewhat stupid because anyone should have
recognized that the majority of the Court was wrong and that the "classic dissent" of Justice
Holmes was correct. Anyone reading the earlier Hammer decision would have formed the
impression that the earlier Court was there saying that anyone who did not believe in the
Hammer majority opinion was obviously stupid.
See also The Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
141 Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590.
142 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, supra note 141, at § 3(5).
143 Id. at § 3(6).
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See note 73 supra.
If you have a back yard and it has a tree.
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federal control under the authority of the clothespin case? It is apparent that
very little of American industry is that provincial. Conversely stated, virtually
all American industry is today conducted in' such a way or under such circumstances that it comes within the reach of the federal commerce' power.14
The net result is that as far as employment and industry are generally concerned, the commerce power has the same reach as though article I, section 8,
clause 3 of the Constitution gave Congress the power to regulate the general
welfare."4 9 This is a long step away from the turn of the century when the first
Federal Employers' Liability Act was held invalid because it extended to all
employees of carriers as distinguished from those who were engaged in interstate
commerce. 50 The Act of 1970 is likewise a long step away from the decision
of the Court in 1936 in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,''in which the Court held
that it was beyond the power of Congress to establish a code of fair competition
for the soft coal industry, stating:
But, in addition to what has just been said, the conclusive answer is that
the evils are all local evils over which the federal government has no legislative control. The relation of employer and employees is a local relation....
Working conditions are obviously local conditions. The employees are not
engaged in or about commerce, but exclusively in producing a commodity.
And the controversies and evils, which it is the object of the Act to regulate
and minimize, are local controversies and evils affecting local work undertaken to accomplish that local result. Such effect as they may have upon
commerce, however extensive it may be, is secondary and indirect. An increase in the greatness of the effect adds to its importance. It does not
alter its characteristics....
One can anticipate that the trend evidenced by the Act of 1970 will lead
in the future to the adoption of a national workmen's compensation law. In
support of such a statute will be the argument of uniformity in payments and
procedure and the elimination of questions of competing jurisdiction, such as to
whether the federal law or a state statute applies, as in the case of workers in a
dockyard, or as to whether the law of state A or of state B applies, in situations
in which the contract of employment is made in one state but actual work, such
as selling or construction, is to be done in another state. 2
148 Even my hypothetical clothespin case gives little comfort to states-righters for if you
would sell your homemade clothespins to a neighbor they would probably be competing with
interstate-made clothespins on sale at the supermarket and therefore you would be "affecting
interstate commerce" within the scope of United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., 307
U.S. 533 (1939); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942); and Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
149 Once it is conceded that an activity is within the reach of the commerce power, its
regulation cannot be challenged because of its general welfare objective. United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 '(1941).
150 The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908). The statute was then amended
to restrict it to employees of interstate carriers who were working in interstate commerce.
The statute was held valid. Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 223
U.S. 1 (1917).
151 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
Current support for the view that the Supreme Court should not function as a "continuing
constitutional convention" and should interpret the Constitution as written is found in the
dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger in Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
152 Notice that the waters of this problem of interstate conflict are destined to be muddied
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C. Administratiue Ascendancy
A large percentage of determinations, that is, decision-making in the management sense, is today made by the administrative agency. As of 1933, courts
were taking a much greater part in such determinations. At that time, the
United States Supreme Court was equating due process to laissez-faire and
invalidating both state and federal legislation which, in seeking to improve the
general welfare, interfered with freedom of contract. The scope of the federal
commerce power was determined by the later-to-be-condemned distinction between manufacturing as a change of form and commerce as a change of place,
with only the latter coming within the reach of the federal commerce power.
The modem administrative agency had already appeared by 1933 but functioned
in a relatively small area of the total economy such as the regulation of public
utilities, transportation, insurance, and banking; and workmen's compensation.
Today, a large percentage of determinations that affect society are made
by administrative agencies. Decreasingly are these matters left to management
to decide. As matters of an increasingly technical nature are entrusted to administrative agencies, the courts are exercising less and less control over the
agencies. Increasingly, the courts have refused to interfere in areas of administrative agencies." 3 Theoretically, the courts still maintain the right to interfere
when there is arbitrary and capricious administrative action. But what is arbitrary and capricious? Is it enough that the court disagrees with the action of
the administrator? No. Is it enough that the court would not have made the
same decision if it had been the administrator? No. Is administrative action
arbitrary and capricious when it causes people to lose money? No. Is it enough
that the administrative action is unwise? No. Thus, for all practical purposes,
the right to appeal from administrative agency action is virtually useless in the
great majority of cases because the court will not upset what the administrator
has done. Courts are showing a greater tendency to keep out of the picture
and let the administrator handle the matter. This is seen particularly in cases
involving pollution. The courts express the view that the matter in controversy
involves many more persons and interests than the one plaintiff and the one
defendant before the court, and, therefore, it is not proper to decide far-reaching
community problems in ordinary private litigation, but that, to the contrary,
the administrative agency will be better able to take all matters into consideration. The Supreme Court has refused to take a case brought by the state of
Ohio to enjoin chemical corporations in other states and in Canada from dumping mercury into water which ran into Lake Erie from which some Ohio cities
obtained their water supply. "4 Although the United States Constitution expressly authorizes a suit brought by the state against nonresidents, the Supreme
by substituting the concept of the state with the most significant contacts for the state where
the contract was made or the injury was sustained.
153 The courts are avoiding the inconsistency which appears in the law of jury determinations, where expert testimony is admissible to interpret X-ray photographs, on the theory that
the jury lacks the ability to understand the X-rays, but it is then held that when the experts
disagree as to the meaning of the X-rays, the jury is to determine which expert is correct.
United States v. Dudley, 64 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1933).
154 Ohio v. Wyandotte Chem. Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
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Court refused to exercise this power on the ground that the lawsuit represented
merely a segment of the overall problem of the pollution of Lake Erie, and that
this problem was being considered and had been considered for some years by
both state and international agencies and commissions and that the Court should
therefore not interfere with the actions of the experts in the absence of a peculiarly
"federal" question.
In simple terms, this means that the problems and technological complexities
of the twentieth century are pushing the courts out of the picture and placing
the administrative agency in full control. Many persons were shocked by the
recent proposal to have wage and price control boards from which no appeal
could be taken. It is conceded that this is novel but it is honest-it recognizes
that for all practical purposes an appeal from an administrative agency has no
value in cases which require the making of a judgment upon the basis of factual
data. This recognition has a most salutary effect for it makes it clear that it is
the responsibility of every citizen to have well-trained administrative officials.
This applies not only to the top-ranking members of the national commission,
but to all staff members, field examiners, and the myriad of personnel who come
into direct contact with the business which they regulate. The importance of
their training is obvious. An airline gives a pilot's job only to an applicant passing rigorous tests and intensive training. Can we be any less careful in the training and selecting of the men who will pilot and control the work of the administrative agencies? The premise that administrative agency members and employees must have high qualifications must be accepted by American society as the
starting point.
D. Rights and the Environment
I regret to see so much time and intellectual brilliance misapplied in seeking
to find past authority for a right to control the environment. I do not see the
value of past legal precedent, if there be any, in our search for a solution to
the socio-physical problems posed today by man and the environment. In the
effort to find precedent for a "right to a decent environment" one writer looks
to the Preamble of the United States Constitution and finds a condemnation of
noise pollution in the statement relating to insuring "domestic tranquillity." Unless I misread the pages of history, this phrase meant to the Framers of the Constitution much the same as what "law and order" means to us today. I find it
difficult to believe that the Framers of the Constitution could have contemplated
modem noise pollution in view of the fact that the first factory was constructed
in the United States after the Constitution was adopted. Sam Slater, who had
worked in Awkright's Factory in England, built a factory in New England from
memory, since the English mercantilist policy prohibited the exportation of blueprints or working models of her then-rising factory system. I doubt if the Framers
living in an eighteenth-century rural America could have foreseen the noise of
twentieth-century highway transportation and the noise of the supersonic jet
planes of the 1960's.
It has also been contended that regulation of environment can be sustained
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under the ninth amendment to the Constitution. This amendment declares "the
enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people." Does this amendment declare any
constitutional "environmental right"? Not in direct terms. Is there any authority
for the proposition that in 1790 there was an "environmental right" of the
people to which the ninth amendment can apply? The answer is simply "no."
Society was concentrating on obtaining political freedom, as declared in the
Declaration of Independence, and economic freedom, as declared in Adam
Smith's Wealth of Nations. There was neither the time nor the occasion to
speculate as to whether there would be an environmental right two centuries
later when technical devices yet unheard of should arise and thirteen agrarian
states clinging to the Atlantic seaboard would expand westward to become a
vast industrialized nation. When the Philadelphia Convention which drafted
the present Constitution completed its labors, Patrick Henry and two other
members refused to sign the draft of the new constitution because they feared
it would create a new tyranny in substitution for that which the American Revolution had been waged to overthrow. The bargaining and the strategy employed to secure the ratification of the new Constitution by the necessary number
of states make it clear that the man of 1790 did not have the least idea that there
was a right to a desirable environment. If he gave the matter any thought, he
had a remedy readily available: move westward, and thus we find Daniel Boone
in 1807 writing that he was going to move westward because the valley where
he lived was becoming overcrowded because someone was clearing land for a
cabin five miles from Boone's cabin.
Should we today assume that the man of 1790 possessed a right to a decent
environment but just did not know about it? If so, what was the origin of that
fight? If it antedates 1790 was it possessed by the Colonials as successors to the
displaced Indian tribes, or was it part of the Mayflower compact of 1620? If
we want to push the absurdity further, assuming that the Colonials brought a
right to environment to the new American colonies, where did it originate so
that the Colonials could bring it from England? Did it come into England with
the Norman Conquest of 1066? Had the invading Romans, Angles, or Saxons,
brought the right to England? We will find it easier to obtain solutions for
modem problems relating to the environment if we turn the page of legal history
and start a new chapter with a new right that society now wants. The lawyer
finds it intellectually difficult to recognize a new right when none existed before.
What we are witnessing is more acceptable to the political scientist, for we are
witnessing the "spontaneous" generation of a right because society wishes it to
exist. Is not this merely a manifestation of what we call the democratic process
at work?
If one questions that there is a phenomenon by which rights spring up
where they did not exist before and become clothed with legal protection, consider the right of privacy. Today, the "right of privacy" is recognized as an
essential element of American law and everyone concedes that there is such a
right. A century ago, this right of privacy did not exist in American law. Is
it not strange that with all the generations of liberty-loving Americans the right
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of privacy did not obtain recognition until the period following 1890?... Certainly, the men who wrote the Declaration of Independence were conscious of
"rights."
Surely the men who insisted that the Bill of Rights Amendment be added
to the new Constitution in 1790 were conscious of rights. How can we explain that those men and the law did not come around to recognizing a
right of privacy until a full century later?
The answer in very simple terms is that people worry about the problems which face them. Back in the days of the Declaration of Independence and the framing of the Constitution, no one was concerned about the
right of privacy. Notice the extent of the fears and concerns of the framers
of the Bill of Rights Amendment to the Constitution. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, added in 1790, states, "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, house, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath and affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized." The man of 1790 was afraid of a recurrence of the days of George
III. In a voice reminiscent of James Otis decrying against the writs of
assistance, the framers of the Fourth Amendment declared what we today
would have regarded as a segment of privacy--protection from police invasion of privacy. The marn of 1790 was just not concerned with invasion
of privacy by a private person. While a snooping person could be prosecuted
to some extent under a peeping-tom statute, this was limited to some area
or conduct relating to peeping into a house or similar place and was only a
criminal liability. The victim could not sue for damages for the invasion
of privacy.
What should we say of the right of privacy? If we are honest with
history, all that we can say is that modern man thinks highly of his privacy
and wants it to be protected. Knowing that the law is responsive to the
wishes of society we can go one step further and say that the right is protected. But note that we should go no further than to say that it is a right
which society wishes to protect at the present time....
I believe most wholeheartedly in the American way of life and the
concepts on which our society and government are based but that does not
obscure the fact that once upon a time there was no American way of life
and that the concept of man possessing rights recognized by government
was the fruit of more than a mere revolution. It was a product of creation.
While many religious leaders, philosophers, and poets spoke of the rights of
man and of the dignity of man, governments laughed at such pretensions
and held man tight in a society based on status. A man had rights, not as
a man but because he held a given status. If he were a nobleman, he had
the rights of a nobleman of his degree. If he were a warrior, he had the
rights of a warrior. If a slave, he had very little rights at all. In each case,
the law saw only status; it was not the man who had rights but the status
of nobleman, the status of warrior, the status of slave.
In the course of time, serfdom displaced slavery in much of the western
world. Eventually feudalism disappeared and with the Treaty of Westphalia
of 1644, putting an end to the Thirty Years' War, the modern society of
nations was deemed to appear. Surely, one might say that in such a "new
world order" man had rights. No, not as a man but only as a subject. Even
when the English colonists settled in America, they brought with them not
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the rights of men but the rights of British subjects. Even when the colonies
were within one year of war, their Second Continental Congress presented
to King George III the Olive Branch Petition in which they beseeched
him to recognize their rights as Englishmen. For almost a year the destiny
of the colonies hung in the balance as to whether they should stay within
the empire seeking to obtain recognition of their rights as Englishmen, a
"status" recognition, or whether they should do something more.
Finally, the ill-advised policies of George III and the eloquence of
Thomas Paine's Common Sense tipped the scales and the colonies spoke
on July 4, 1776, not in the terms of the rights of English subjects, but in
terms of the rights of man existing independently of any government. Had
the American Revolution been lost, the Declaration of Independence would
have gone rattling down the corridors of time with many another failure.
More fortunately for us, the American Revolution was won, and the new
government that was established was based upon "man" as the building
block rather than upon "subjects." Rights of man replaced the concept of
rights of subjects. With this transition, society comes from status to freedom.
The obligations of a king to his faithful subjects were replaced by the rights
of man existing without regard to the will or authority of any king. America
is now going through the growing stages of determining what is embraced
by the concept of "rights of man." To cite one growing problem, note the
right of privacy. Other rights will be observed growing up and are still
growing.
Some may criticize the above analysis on the theory that rights existed
before they were recognized. This raises the obvious question of when did
they begin to exist. Let us take the rights of free speech, freedom of the
press, and free assembly. If these rights existed in law before our Constitution declared them to exist, when did they come into existence? Did they
exist in ancient Egypt under the Pharoahs, in ancient Rome under the
Caesars, in the Holy Roman Empire under Charlemagne, in feudal England
under the Edwards? Did freedom of the press exist before there was printing? Before there was writing? The concept of legal rights floating in the
air, unrecognized by any government, is absurd enough but to have them
floating in the air only over that portion of the British Empire which becomes the United States, is doubly absurd.' 56
I am aware that there are a number of schools of political science which
are in conflict with the views expressed above. I note, however, that the writings
on which those schools of thought are based antedate the era of democracy and
the era of industrialization. What was written in ancient Greece or in France
before the French Revolution or in England before the 1867 abolition of property ownership as a qualification on the right to vote does not necessarily have
validity today. Just as I know that I cannot write a book on the law of Zanzibar
because I do not have the least idea of its existing law, culture, and economy,
I question how even the wisest man living in the earlier agrarian, non-democratic
societies could speak of law with such universal validity as to be true centuries
later in an industrialized democracy.
The view has also been expressed that the environment is held in trust for
the benefit of all. Who declared the trust in what? When factory X purchased
a tract of land in what was then wilderness, no one included in the deed any
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provision that the air space would be held by the factory in trust for the .benefit
of the community. If we believe in stare decisis, we must recognize that the factory holds the air space just as free from control as it does the surface of the land
or the subsurface. To say that after many years, the air space is held in trust
is merely misbranding.'57 When we tell the factory that it holds its air space
in trust for the community, we are really seeking to sugarcoat the fact that society
is commandeering the property of the factory, and in a non-"free enterprise" -way
is telling the factory owner how he should use his property.
The "trust" concept is dangerous because it "proves" too much. If air space
is held in trust for society, why not subsurface rights? Why not say to the owner
of land that he holds the minerals beneath the surface in trust for the benefit of
the community? And how do we limit the trust concept to property? Why -not
say that every individual holds his personal skills and ability to work in trust
for the community and therefore society can require him to work the way society
planners direct? This you will say cannot be done in a free society. But if that
which is privately owned (the air space) must be held in trust for the community, how can you validly draw the line between air space and other assets
privately owned? The inability to draw any boundary line makes it apparent
that the trust theory contains the seeds of tyranny-in the name of the common
good everyone can be told what to do with what. Is this any more palatable to
American concepts because it is our own government and not an individualan irresponsible tyrant- who is establishing the rule? Should we not bear in
mind that the rules as to what the community requires will undoubtedly be made
by an administrative agency consisting of men who are not popularly elected
and who are subject to such minimal judicial review that for all practical purposes their decision will be final?
I object to finding any protection of the environment on the basis of a constitutional or legal right because to so describe the desired objective of society is
to mislead and distract attention from the real problems involved. Let us assume
as a starting premise that there is a constitutional right to a good environment.
Now consider the facts of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. 5 ' In that case, the
court found that a cement manufacturer was causing damage to the surrounding
area by polluting the air with particulate matter. The court awarded money
damages for the harm done to the plaintiffs property but refused to stop the
running of the plant because everything scientifically possible to eliminate the
evil had been done, no one in the industry knew of any way to eliminate the
evil, the cement plant represented an investment of 45 million dollars, and employed more than 300 people. If we say that Booner had a constitutionallyprotected right to enjoy an unpolluted environment, we would be tempted to
conclude that the cement factory must be shut down. Unless, of course, we say
that even constitutional rights are not absolute and that all constitutional freedoms have some limitation. Will our decision be influenced by the consideration
157 Analogy to wild game which is deemed owned by the sovereign "in trust" for the
people, is misleading. The wild game was not owned by a private person. The factory did
own the air space above its factory.
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that if the -New York plant of the Atlantic Cement Company is shut down in
order to obtain a decent environment, every other cement factory in the country
must also be shut down? Will society show such a firm belief in clean air that
it will willingly return to dirt roads and mud adobe huts?
We cannot avoid this dilemma on the ground that only one cement factory
was involved in the Boomer case. A court must bear in mind that the decision
it makes as to cement company. A will be invoked against company B, company
C, company D, and so on. If one properly-run cement plant is to be shut down,
does not the concept of equality require that all must be shut down?
Significant in any determination of the problem from a societal, if not a
legalistic, standpoint will be the consideration of the availability and comparative
-cost of substitute materials that could replace the cement.
Assuming that there is a constitutional or legal right to a decent environ.ment, will the environment-polluting industries be permitted to continue to
pollute the environment by analogy to the "unavoidably unsafe" exception in

strict tort liability?
Perhaps the answer will be to project zoning from a local to a national level.
That is, zone the country in terms of areas where industry may locate. For
example, cement factories would be allowed to locate in zone X where the wind
patterns are such that the cement dust will fall within a naturally-blighted area.
Is the determination of what should be done advanced in any way by speaking
of constitutional and legal rights or of a trust duty with respect to the environment? We must face the problem that we have conflicting interests involved and
we must make policy decisions as to what will be best for society. It is a problem
in public management rather than "law."
IV. Reform in Haste
Society, generally, and democracies in particular, seem prone to make
reforms in haste. Sometimes this results in the reform objective being defeated
or handicapped. In other instances, the result is that the reform goes too far
and makes changes that are undesirable and unnecessary. Illustrative of the first
category is the current agitation to give protection to the consumer from waivers
of warranties. The Uniform Commercial Code approves the waiver of warranty as long as warranties of fitness are waived in a manner which if in writing
is conspicuous.' 59 But the Code also permits a limitation of remedies, as by
making repair or refund the extent of liability, where there is a breach of warranty and the plaintiff has sustained property or economic loss." ° Such a limitation is "prima facie unconscionable" as to "consequential damages for injury to
the person in the case of consumer goods, but limitation of damages where the
loss is commercial is not."''1
Interestingly, the solicitude felt by the drafters of the Code in preventing
surprise exclusions or disclaimers of warranties in U.C.C. § 2-316 was forgotten
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by the time U.C.C. § 2-719 wks reached, for the latter section does not include
any limitation in terms of conspicuousness. A strict construction of the Code
would justify the conclusion that only the total exclusion of a warranty must be
conspicuous and a refund-replacement-repair limitation need not be conspicuous.
One may suspect that when the question arises as to the effect of an inconspicuous
limitation, the courts may seize upon the concept of unconscionability and regard
it as protecting from surprise, from which it could be concluded that a limitation
of remedies clause which was not conspicuous was unconscionable. Applying
the Code to a practical situation, we can envisage a buyer purchasing an electric
fan for his home. The warranty of fitness for normal use 16 2 cannot be excluded
by a writing which does not satisfy the standards of U.C.C. § 2-316. If the
seller does not go to the extreme of seeking to say "no warranties" but is willing
to meet the buyer part way to the extent of accepting warranty liability but then
declaring "when there is a breach of warranty I will refund your money," the
seller thereby avoids the limitations of U.C.C. § 2-316 and the only limitation
is that found in the concept of "unconscionability" in U.C.C. § 2-719(2).
Assume that when the buyer uses the fan in his home it short circuits and starts
a fire which destroys the buyer's house. The buyer's fire loss is excluded by the
Code unless the court will conclude that the limitation limiting the buyer to a
refund is unconscionable."'3
There are various proposals now current to adopt statutes or administrative
regulations limiting or preventing the seller or manufacturer from excluding
warranties. From the illustration above given, it is apparent that a hasty regulation of warranty waiver will not give the consumer the protection which the
reformer has in mind. It is apparent that there must be a broad overall ap- "
proach to all types of clauses which may affect or bar a recovery, whether stated
in terms of an exclusion of warranty, a limitation of remedy, a requirement of
notice in order to "register" a warranty, a notice of claim to be given of harm
sustained, or any other type of restrictive provision that may be devised.
Likewise, consideration should be given to the scope of the class intended
to be benefited by the reform. The "consumer" is the natural point of focus of'
attention, but is he the only one intended to be benefited? Consider the case of
a manufacturer selling a twenty-ton metal press to a factory making kitchen
utensils. An employee is injured in using the press because it does not function
properly. When he seeks to hold the manufacturer liable, the latter points to a
clause in the contract by which his obligation is limited to making repairs without cost. Is this limitation binding upon the employee? Is 'the press "consumer'
goods" within the scope of U.C.C. § 2-719? It is apparent that there will be a
strong temptation to hold that it is "equipment." One may well expect that
eventually the concept of "consumer" will be broadened to extend to any persoh
using the goods, whether he purchased them or not, or any person exposed to
danger by the use of the goods, without regard to the identity of the actual
user.
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of the time of the making of the contract, it would seem that a court would be reluctant to
apply the unconscionability concept in the hypothetical situation here contidered.
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In some situations, the problems above noted have been bypassed by courts
in the last few decades by applying the strict tort liability concept. This does not
mean that society should not make an intelligent re-assessment of the problem,
as-opposed to reforming in haste, for the reason that the scope of recovery under
strict tort and warranty sometimes differ-in some states, property loss is not
covered.
I do not think that it is a satisfactory solution to the warranty problem to
state that strict tort liability may be imposed, for the reason that I can remember
how our law school class in common-law procedure pointed the finger of scorn
at the common-law courts with their many procedural distinctions, such as those
between trespass and trespass on the case, and thought how absurd it was that
a plaintiff should lose because he happened to enter the hall of justice by the
wrong door. I have the feeling that society is doing the same thing as did the
common-law judges when current society plays this game of warranty versus
strict tort liability. It may well be that we will eventually have a fusion of the
theories of product liability.'" In making a reform of the warranty-waiver problem in order to protect the consumer, we should not in haste merely put a patch
on the law in much the same manner as a small boy might put a rubber patch on
a bicycle tire, but we must give careful thought to how what is proposed fits
into the overall pattern of product liability. Above all, we must recognize that
this is not exclusively a "legal" question. Our reform must begin with research
to educate ourselves as to the socio-economic needs and problems of today's
society and the effect of our proposed reforms.
Another consequence of reforming in haste is that the reformer does not
build upon the experience of the past. This may be illustrated by the granting
of the class action right to consumers as part of the current consumer protection
reform movement. First, why is it necessary to give consumers the right to bring
a class action? Since the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, consumers
could bring a class action when the rights involved were "several, and there is a
common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief
is sought.""' This was the so-called "spurious class action" and was in substance a form of permissive joinder of plaintiffs.'
This form of class action was
authorized by state rules of civil procedure which within the following decade
were adopted by the great majority of the states." Spurious class actions were
at one time in legal history held improper on the ground that there was not a
class merely because there was a similarity of experiences of the various members of the alleged class. Under the modern spurious class action, purchasers of
stock have been allowed to bring a class action in order to recover their individual
losses resulting from false promotional statements, and employees have been
allowed to bring such an action against their employer to recover overtime
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wages. The right of consumers to bring a class action on behalf of themselves

and other consumers similarly situated has been judicially recognized.' 8
In light of the foregoing, one can well ask what has been achieved by
statutes expressly giving consumers the right to bring a class action? In many
states it is provided that the consumer's class action may be brought by the
attorney general or some other official. Here, the reform has the advantage of
shifting the expense of litigation onto the attorney general and the government.
In view of the rising demands upon public treasuries, society should consider
whether a class action by the attorney general at the public expense is the est
way of meeting the problem.
I am not suggesting that we turn our back on the consumer and return him
to his status as of 1900. To the contrary, I contend that we should carefully
examine the years since 1900 to see if we cannot develop some procedure better
than the class action. Those familiar with the problems of stockholder litigation
and the history of class actions under the modem rules of civil procedure are
not entirely in accord that the right to bring a class action has made any significant improvement in the position of the consumer beyond putting the expense of
litigation on someone else's shoulders. Consider the situation in which you order
a $25.00 consumer item from a mail-order house in a distant state. Will the right
to bring a class action be of any value to you? How will you know who are in
the class? You will probably retain an attorney to obtain discovery of -other
customers of the seller who have made complaints and your attorney will then
communicate with them to see if they are interested in joining in a class action. I
suspect that for a $25.00 item you will probably say this is not worth the trouble.
Is there some new form of proceeding that modem society can devise? I suggest that a careful exploration of the history of indemnity funds under the Torrens Land Registration System, state unindemnified motorist funds, oil spill
indemnity funds, and foreign insurer's deposit funds might reveal that a new
procedure could be devised for making the consumer complaint to an administrative agency in charge of a consumer indemnity fund. The agency, if satisfied -of
the merits of the consumer's case, could pay the consumer the amount -of his
claim and then take an assignment from him of the claim. Careful study-is
required to work out the details so as to be both practical and fair not only to
the parties involved but also to the taxpayers and consumers generally who are
paying for the administration of the system in one way or another.
The fact that so many of us believe in our present judicial system should
not blind us to the fact that our present system exists in a sense by defaultthe jury outlived its rivals of trial by battle, trial by ordeal, and compurgation.
Is it beyond the realm of possibility that modem man who has found .better ways
of transportation, better ways of communication, better ways of building and
heating houses, better ways of refrigeration may not be able to devise a better way
of administering justice? Perhaps if he researched as carefully with respect to
168 Vasquez v. The Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 94"Cal. Rptr. 796, 484 P.2d 964 (1971)
(permitting a group of buyers under a frozen food and freezer plan to bring a class action
on behalf of themselves and other buyers to cancel their contracts because of fraudulent
misrepresentations by the seller's agents).
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the societal matters as he has done in the quest for material things, there would
be a better judicial system for all and not merely just for consumers.
A very grave danger in reforming in haste is that apart from failing to help
those intended to be helped, a hasty reform can very well harm others. The field
of consumer protection again furnishes a good illustration of this. Starting with
the premise that a consumer should be able to assert the defense of failure of consideration and fraud in the inducement even as against a holder in due course
of commercial paper given by him to his seller, many jurisdictions have gone
beyond saying just that and have declared the commercial paper not negotiable.
This protects the consumer but it introduces unnecessary confusion and uncertainty into credit transactions. Assume that the buyer and a comaker sign
the buyer's note. What is the liability of the comaker? If the instrument is
negotiable, Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code supplies the easy answer.
If the paper is not negotiable, we must turn to the non-Code law and find ourselves in the nineteenth century. Assume that the buyer's note is indorsed by the
seller-payee to a finance company or bank. What is the liability of the sellerindorser? Within what time must the holder give the indorser notice of the
maker's default? If this is consumer paper which has been made "nonnegotiable"
we must turn back again to the nineteenth century for the answer to these questions, rather than to the easy answers in the Code. What is the effect of a forgery
or an alteration on such paper? What is the effect of an impairment of collateral? Is the holder of the paper subject to an adverse claim to the paper? For
answers to these and many other questions we must turn our backs on the clearcut answers given by Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code and go back
into an obscure earlier century. This would not only be a most difficult research
task in many instances, but consider the practical absurdity of so doing-the
Negotiable Instrument Law was drafted at the end of the last century because a
"modern" law was needed by the new business world. The U.C.C. was drafted
in the middle of this century because the N.I.L. had by then become outdated
and no longer fitted the needs of what was the then "modem" world. Now
comes the over-eager consumer protectionist and tells us that the solution for
the consumer protection problem is to make consumer protection paper rionnegotiable and shove it back into a society before the Uniform Commercial
Code, before the Negotiable Instruments Law. When one realizes that a large
part of commercial paper circulating in our economy and supporting federal
reserve notes arose from consumer transactions, one may very well question if
the world of credit and finance does not need protection from the consumer
protectionist. The simple answer is that everyone needs protection from hasty
reforms that fall short of or overshoot their objectives.
As another aspect of the injunction against making reforms in haste, we
should not evaluate the status quo nor proposed reforms without making an
intelligent analysis of all data. I read with much interest that no-fault insurance
has reduced the volume of collision litigation in Massachusetts. On the basis of
this fact, the Massachusetts Plan has been hailed as a great success. Is reduction
of litigation the sole objective of no-fault insurance? If the object of society is
to reduce litigation, I suggest that you stand on the courthouse steps with a shot-
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gun and threaten to blow off anyone's head who makes a move to start a lawsuit. This would certainly reduce the litigation rate and your reform plan might
be hailed as a great success. But I doubt whether you would wish to adopt the
shotgun plan, for the reason that litigation reduction is not the prime objective.
Society wants the fair, prompt settlement of legitimate claims. If that be so,
should we not inquire further into the Massachusetts statistics to see whether the
litigation which is not brought because of the no-fault plan represents "bad"
claims that should not be asserted? If research does not support the conclusion
that "bad" claims have been squeezed out and that "good" claims still prevail,
how should we evaluate the no-fault plan? I would like to know much more than
the available statistics indicate in order to appraise whether the reduction of the
Massachusetts litigation rate is evidence that the Massachusetts no-fault insurance plan is good or that it is bad.
If we go back to the beginning of the century, one of the big arguments in
favor of adopting workmen's compensation was the fact that the great difficulty
of recovering in a negligence-based lawsuit ,against an employer resulted in a
very large percentage of worthwhile claims being scared away from the courtroom. If keeping out of court a worthy claim for an employee's injury was an
evil at the turn of the century, by what magic can we say that keeping worthwhile claims out of a courtroom today is good? I am not speaking in opposition
to no-fault insurance; I am merely, asking how it really works. As a citizen, I
have the right to know. As a citizen, I have the duty to inquire. If no-fault
insurance is not working properly, we should hasten to repeal laws adopting it.
If it is working well, we should consider whether its underlying concept should
be extended to other areas of liability-determination. From the standpoint of
the injured person, should there be a difference when he falls in a hole in the
floor in the grocery store and when he is run over by the delivery truck of the
grocery store? Careful research and thought may indicate that modern society,
in the interest of equality and rehabilitation, should impose liability on the basis
of causation. This admittedly would turn our legal backs on the concept of
fault but we must carefully examine and determine whether liability based on
fault is appropriate to our industrialized age and large population; careful
consideration should be given to workmen's compensation, liability for damage
from use of dynamite, liability for failure to install safety devices, and liability
for ocean spills and pollution. 69
V. Lawyers as Leaders
Lawyers, because they have direct knowledge of how government and law
work, can be the leaders in educating society to the new needs of society.
Lawyers have a potential for leadership in the newly-emerging society because
of their experience in dealing, with strange situations and their experience in
seeking to reconcile conflicting views. The spectrum of modern human experience is too broad for any man to be an expert in more than his own sector
169 See, e.g., Arizona v. Arizona Mines Supply Co., 484 P.2d 619 (Ariz. 1971); United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
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of study or research. Somehow, society must put together all the pieces and
perhaps by so doing can put them together closer to the heart's desire. The
lawyer's training in handling conflicting concepts, his experience in dealing
with clients whose businesses are strange to him-all have given the lawyer a
skill in information collating and determination making. 7 "
As a word of caution, the training of a lawyer tends to cast him in the
pattern of an advocate. If the lawyer is to perform the function for modern
society of which he is capable, he must approach the problems of society with
an open mind, he must obtain valid data, and he must appraise it honestly and
impartially, unbiased by a blind devotion to past concepts. In effect, he must be
a strict judge and require that every contending thought or social policy carry
the burden of proof as to its validity. This is the leadership which America
needs and will need increasingly in the future as our socio-industrial problems
become increasingly complex. Once again, the lawyers have the great opportunity that they had in the early days of our republic-the opportunity of being
truly the nation's leaders. I hope that nothing that I have said is misconstrued
as having any political implications. My client is these United States of America
which countless courageous men before me have granted to me for the term of
my natural life, to hold in trust for my fellow man and for future generations.
I rest my case, but I hope that the lawyers of America will not rest but will
strive ever forward to achieve the Great American Dream.

170 The phrase "determination making" is used to avoid the connotations and associations
of a court which are attached to the term "decision making." From the standpoint of the
dictionary and of society, anyone faced with the necessity of acting or of choosing between
alternatives, makes a decision. A judicial decision differs from the decision of management,
the decision of an airplane pilot, the decision of a student, the decision of your cook, only
in terms of who makes the determination and the sphere of application of the determination.
All have the common denominator of analyzing the facts, applying some standard or rule to
the facts, and making a determination-a decision-by virtue of such application.

